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OPENING ADDRESS 
Brendan Whelan 
Director, The Economic and Social Research Institute 
 
WELCOME 
 I would like to welcome you all to this, the seventh Budget 
Perspectives Conference, which is co-hosted by the Economic and 
Social Research Institute and the Foundation for Fiscal Studies. The 
objective of these conferences is to set the scene for the national 
debate on budgetary priorities by presenting a number of papers on 
topics relating to taxation and public expenditure. I should, of 
course, remind everyone that the views expressed are strictly those 
of the individual authors; neither the ESRI nor the FFS takes 
corporate or institutional positions in relation to any of the issues 
raised. 
The economic context in which the 2005 Budget is being 
constructed is quite different from that facing the Minister last year.  
At that time, the international economic situation had been quite 
depressed, with very slow growth in world trade and interest rates at 
historic lows. Inflation in Ireland was running at a higher level than 
in other EU countries and tax revenues had been quite weak. As the 
economy faces into 2005, most of these negative trends have been 
reversed. The international economy is expanding and the Irish 
growth rate has improved appreciably. Tax revenues have become 
much more buoyant and have been further boosted by a number of 
special factors. The pace of inflation has moderated with the Irish 
rate now below that prevailing in some of our EU partners.   
This situation gives the Minister more room for manoeuvre in 
devising the budgetary strategy. While remaining prudent by 
continuing to target an overall position of broad fiscal balance, it 
should be possible to introduce some changes in the patterns of 
taxation and expenditure. The papers presented at today’s 
conference, and the ensuing debate, will, I hope, help to clarify what 
those changes might be and how they could be implemented. 
 
 The conference opens with a presentation by Daniel McCoy and 
Shane Garrett, summarising some of the key trends identified in the 
recent Quarterly Economic Commentary. They project that growth will 
be around its long-run potential level of 5 per cent this year and 
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next (for both GDP and GNP), that inflation will average over 2 
per cent and that the General Government Balance will remain in 
modest surplus, comfortably within the requirements of the Stability 
and Growth Pact. Employment is expected to continue to grow and 
unemployment to stay at historically low levels. The authors also 
take up in their presentation a number of policy themes addressed 
in recent editions of the QEC such as the possible macro-economic 
effects of the Special Savings Investment Accounts and the 
increasingly significant role of house building in the economy. 
 
 One of the great benefits of the Budget Perspectives Conferences is 
that they give us the opportunity to hear the views of experts from 
outside the country. This year we very fortunate to have with us a 
distinguished speaker from the Observatoire Français des Conjonctures 
Économiques, Dr Catherine Mathieu. Her paper, which is co-authored 
with Henri Sterdyniak, reviews the development of the Stability and 
Growth Pact, assesses the difficulties which have arisen with it and 
suggests an agenda for reform. The paper evaluates the wide range 
of reforms that have been proposed by academics and others, 
including the “golden rule”, new committees and institutions and 
the role of ageing and pension provision in the debate. The authors’ 
own solution emphasises the need for a relatively light regulatory 
touch. They suggest that surveillance at EU level should bear only 
on issues which have the potential to lead to negative externalities 
between countries in the monetary union, especially by ensuring that 
inflation within each country stays in line with a specified inflation 
target for the eurozone as a whole. This morning Catherine will only 
have time to present the main points of this comprehensive paper; 
the full version in the published volume repays further careful study. 
An Appropriate 
Fiscal Framework 
for the Eurozone
 
 In the third presentation, Tim Callan and Brian Nolan examine 
why relative income poverty rates in Ireland have remained high 
compared with many other EU countries. They begin by presenting 
the basic facts of the situation and look at a variety of possible 
explanations for the observed patterns. They conclude that 
differences in demographic factors, such as age structure, the 
pattern of labour force participation and household composition do 
not generally account for differences between Ireland and better 
performing countries such as Denmark and the Netherlands. The 
most likely explanation appears to lie in the different tax and welfare 
structures of these countries which involve substantially higher costs 
in the form of higher taxation. This conclusion raises important 
strategic choices in relation to economic incentives, labour market 
behaviour and economic growth. 
Relative Income 
Poverty Risk in 
Ireland 
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 The final presentation of the morning, by Anne Nolan and Brian 
Nolan, examines three key aspects of Ireland’s health care system.  
It begins by taking an overall view and benchmarks the Irish system 
against that in 21 other countries. In general they characterise the 
performance of the health care system as disappointing. They also 
show that the most striking feature of Ireland’s health spending is 
how rapidly it has increased in absolute terms in recent years. The 
second part of the paper considers the use of general practitioner 
services by persons at different income levels, in particular those 
with and without entitlement to free GP services. They find a 
marked difference between the utilisation rates of the two groups 
and consider the implications for policy. The last section of the 
paper examines the complex mix of public and private health care 
operating in Ireland and how it interacts with the market for health 
insurance.  Almost half of the Irish population now pays for private 
health cover and the authors address the issues to which this gives 
rise in relation to equity and incentives.  
Issues in Relation 
to Ireland’s 
Health Care 
System
 
 It is clear from this brief outline that this morning’s papers cover a 
very wide terrain. There will be scope for a short period of 
discussion after each paper and time for a somewhat more extended 
interaction after the final paper. I hope that as many as possible of 
you will participate. 
Final Comment
 
IN SEARCH OF AN 
APPROPRIATE 
EUROPEAN FISCAL 
FRAMEWORK 
Catherine Mathieu* and Henri Sterdyniak** 
 The implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) 
illustrates how simple policy rules may not be enforceable if they 
lack sound economic rationale. The 3 per cent of GDP deficit rule 
embedded in the SGP has been breached in a growing number of 
EU-15 countries since the initiation of the economic downturn in 
late 2000. With six of the ten new Member States in the same 
position, as many as twelve of the twenty-five Member States were 
subject to an Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) in September 
2004.  
1. 
 Introduction
Since the early days of the SGP, the provisions inherited from 
the Maastricht Treaty had been criticised by a number of 
economists and policy-makers arguing that the procedures of fiscal 
surveillance were not providing a satisfactory framework of 
economic policy co-ordination in the European Union. The 
implementation of the SGP had started in a favourable situation of 
rapid growth. But the need for reforming the SGP has become 
more and more obvious since the economic downturn of late 2000. 
In November 2003, when the Ecofin Council did not endorse the 
European Commission recommendations requesting France and 
Germany to take new budgetary measures to bring their deficit 
below 3 per cent of GDP, the SGP seemed almost dead and the EU 
fiscal policy framework under high uncertainties. Ten months later, 
the SGP is still alive, at least on paper, but a new framework seems 
4 
 
* OFCE (Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques) – 69, quai d’Orsay 
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more than ever necessary in an enlarging Union. On 3 September 
2004, the Commission expressed ‘ideas’ depicted by Joachim 
Almunia as ‘an evolution rather than a reform of the SGP’ 
(European Commission, 2004b). On 10 September, the Ecofin 
Council opened the door to a possible reform of the Pact. This 
paper presents a critical assessment of the debate. 
Section 2 recalls the fiscal policy framework in the euro area and 
addresses its weaknesses. Section 3 provides an assessment of the 
first six years of existence of the SGP. Section 4 is devoted to the 
reforms proposed by the Commission. Section 5 discusses 
proposals made by economists to improve the European fiscal 
policy framework. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 Before the launch of the economic and monetary union (EMU), 
two views had been proposed on the conduct of fiscal policies. In 
one view, the EMU should allow each Member State to choose and 
run domestic fiscal policy in full independence. Independent fiscal 
policy is a prerequisite in a monetary union since monetary policy, 
conducted at the area aggregate level, becomes ineffective in the 
event of asymmetric shocks. The exchange rate can no more be 
used as an instrument of economic policy. Price and wage 
adjustments, as well as labour mobility, only play a minor role in 
Europe. But fiscal policy gains strength in a monetary union as it 
will not be counteracted by interest rate rises or exchange rate 
responses.  
2. 
The Existing 
Fiscal Policy 
Framework
According to another view, if each country was allowed to 
conduct fiscal policy without any binding rule, all countries would 
run excessively expansionary policies because they do not have to 
care anymore about their external current account balance or about 
speculation on exchange rate and interest rate markets. Last, a 
country implementing an expansionary fiscal policy alone will not 
be strongly affected by the central bank’s rise in interest rate.  
The single currency strengthens the interdependence between 
participating countries through two new channels. First, each 
country becomes potentially affected by inflation in partner 
countries as it will lead to a rise in the European Central Bank’s 
(ECB) single interest rate. If euro area countries still had the 
possibility to conduct domestic fiscal policy as they wish, this would 
come into contradiction with having given the ECB a price stability 
remit (see Box 1). Second, a country unable to ensure sustainable 
public finances would put at risk the financial stability of the 
monetary union, which could provoke a rise in long-term interest 
rates. It should, however, be recalled that a Member State facing 
financial difficulty is not allowed to ask for the help of the ECB or 
of any partner countries, which limits the risks of contagion 
through higher interest rates. 
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Box 1: On the Compatibility Between a Single Monetary Policy and 
Independent National Fiscal Policies 
The functioning of each Member State economy may be 
summarised as follows: i i iy d g rσ= + − and i0i i yπ π α= + where yi is 
the level of output in the country i (as deviation from potential 
output); iπ , inflation rate in the country i, expressed as deviation 
from the central bank’s inflation target); 0iπ , initial inflation (as 
deviation from the target) or a price shock; di an indicator of private 
demand and gi an indicator of public demand (assumed to be equal 
to the public deficit); r: the single interest rate. It is not possible that 
each country uses fiscal policy with a view to maintaining full 
employment, while monetary policy uses the interest rate to keep 
the aggregate inflation of the area at the desired level. If 0iπ stands 
on average above the central bank’s inflation target, fiscal and 
monetary policies will be incompatible. The central bank would 
raise the interest rate to cut inflation whereas national governments 
would raise public deficits to maintain full employment. This would 
lead to a permanent increase in the interest rate and public deficits 
(Capoen, Sterdyniak and Villa, 1994). 
How can this interdependence be managed? A framework for a 
permanent co-ordination of fiscal policies and monetary policy 
could have been designed. However, it is difficult to imagine how 
urgent decisions could have been conditional on negotiations, with 
no final agreement certain of being reached; an agreement would 
have been imposed on all countries and would have been a direct 
constraint on fiscal policies, which is politically difficult. So it was 
decided to impose constraints on national fiscal policies through the 
SGP. These constraints are not totally rigid. National policies kept 
some room for manoeuvre which could compensate for the fact 
that the rules were not perfectly adapted. But the institutional logic 
is such that constraints are getting stronger over time: national 
authorities are becoming progressively entangled in a ‘spider web’.  
2.1  THE INSTITUTIONAL FISCAL FRAMEWORK  
The monitoring of fiscal discipline is based on four elements: 
criteria inherited from the Maastricht Treaty: the 3 per cent of GDP 
deficit threshold and the 60 per cent reference value for the ratio of 
government debt to GDP; an institutional framework to implement 
fiscal surveillance: the Stability and Growth Pact and a co-
ordination process for economic policy: the Broad Economic Policy 
Guidelines (BEPGs). 
What is the objective of this framework? If it is to avoid a 
country generating negative externalities on partner countries, then 
the rules should bear directly on these externalities, on the level of 
domestic inflation or the default risk of public finances. If the 
objective is economic policy co-ordination, then the ECB and the 
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Member States should discuss and define in an open process the 
policies to be implemented in Europe in view of the different 
national situations. If the objective is to run a common economic 
policy, then a democratically elected economic government of 
Europe should be settled. No clear choice has been made between 
these three possibilities.  
2.2 THE RATIONALE FOR THE 3 PER CENT OF GDP 
REFERENCE VALUE 
The 3 per cent ceiling for deficits is the absolute reference in the 
current fiscal framework because it is the only criterion which may 
lead to sanctions. However, it has no economic rationale. Why 3 per 
cent? The reasons given are awkward. A deficit of 3 per cent of 
GDP would stabilise the debt level at 60 per cent of GDP under a 
nominal GDP growth of 5 per cent. But in that case the reference 
should apply to the cyclically-adjusted balance or to the average 
borrowing over an economic cycle. Then comes the question: why 
60 per cent? The 3 per cent figure would be close to the share of 
public investment in EU GDP. But, there again, the reasoning can 
apply only to cyclically-adjusted deficits. The level of the deficit 
would need to be compared with the observed level of public 
investment, so that a country implementing public investment 
programmes would be entitled to a higher deficit.  
A country hit by a specific fall in domestic private demand may 
need a higher than 3 per cent of GDP deficit. A priori, this does not 
raise inflation in the area. Such a deficit could even benefit partner 
countries since it will prevent the fall in domestic demand which 
would otherwise negatively affect partner countries’ output. In 
2003, the public deficit reached 3.9 per cent of GDP in Germany, 
but inflation was low (1.0 per cent) and the current account in 
surplus (2.2 per cent of GDP). It is difficult to claim that the 
German public deficit generates negative spill-over effects in the 
rest of the area. If there is to be a negative externality, it would be 
rather that the low level of German demand impeded partners’ 
exports to Germany and thereby negatively affects GDP growth in 
these countries. Conversely, the current budgetary procedures do 
not prevent excessive inflation to emerge in a Member State, which 
will induce excessively high interest rates in the area and may have a 
negative impact on partner countries. Inflation was growing at an 
annual rate of 5.1 per cent in the Netherlands in 2001 while 
government borrowing was in balance. Germany does not fulfil the 
deficit criterion but runs a significant current account surplus, 
whereas Spain has a 0 per cent of GDP deficit, but runs a current 
account deficit (see Figure 1). Inflation or current account deficits 
may be more dangerous in terms of negative externalities than 
8 BUDGET PERSPECTIVES 2005 
  
public deficits. Why do surveillance procedures control public 
balance and not external accounts?  
Figure 1: Government Net Lending and Current Accounts (as a Percentage of GDP) 
  Germany Spain 
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Source: OECD Economic Outlook No. 75, June (2004).
 
In the past, deficits have been higher than 3 per cent of GDP 
quite often in industrial countries (see Figure 2) and were then 
judged necessary to support activity. It could be different now only 
if monetary policy was more growth-oriented than in the past. But 
this is not the ECB’s remit. Besides a single monetary policy cannot 
fit all different national cyclical positions (see Table 1) and cannot 
react to country-specific cyclical downturns. Hence, euro area 
countries should be given greater room for budgetary manoeuvre, 
since they can no longer use the exchange rate and interest rates. 
Figure 2: General Government Net Lending  
As a percentage of GDP 
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Note: Excluding proceeds relative to UMTS licences in the euro area. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook No. 75, June (2004).  
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The 3 per cent of GDP requests governments either to strongly 
reduce cyclically-adjusted borrowing, so that some ‘cyclical room 
for manoeuvre’ becomes available, or to maintain some cyclically-
adjusted deficit and then loose any cyclical room for manoeuvre. 
Some authors (Artis and Buti, 2000, or Barrell, 2001) evaluate the 
level of structural deficit needed in each country to prevent public 
deficits from rising above 3 per cent of GDP in downturns. But 
such deficits are not optimal, since they are conditional on the 
arbitrary 3 per cent ceiling.  
If we consider that there may be a negative output gap of 3 per 
cent of GDP in euro area economies and that a 1 per cent fall in 
GDP generates a 0.5 per cent of GDP rise in public deficits, then 
deficits of 1.5 per cent of GDP could be allowed in normal times. 
Let d, the level of public deficit as a share of GDP, b, the level of 
public debt as a share of GDP, g, nominal output growth. In 
equilibrium: / .b d g=  If, as in Germany, g equals 3 per cent, b will 
converge towards 50 per cent if d equals 1.5 per cent on average. If, 
as for new members of the Union, g equals 7, b will converge 
towards 21 per cent. The 3 per cent limit has different 
consequences in terms of public debt depending on output growth. 
These consequences have not been explicitly taken into account in 
the existing fiscal framework. As pointed out by Fitz Gerald et al. 
(2004), the recent enlargement of the Union makes the issue more 
critical as the new Member States have higher nominal GDP 
growth potentials than the EU-15 average. 
If Member States want to have safety margins to avoid 
breaching the 3 per cent ceiling in downturns, they need to run 
restrictive fiscal policies in ‘good times’. But the provisions of the 
SGP only apply in situations where deficits breach the 3 per cent 
ceiling, and hence are most likely to operate in downturns, i.e., 
when running pro-cyclical restrictive policies will add to the 
weakness of output growth. The Commission wishes to be entitled 
to react in ‘good times’ (see Section 4). But it is then difficult to 
define appropriate policies because of the uncertainties on the level 
of the output gap and on the optimal level of public deficit.  
Growth and inflation still differ significantly among euro area 
economies (see Table 1); output gaps based on OECD estimates 
fluctuate from -4 per cent of potential GDP in Portugal or Ireland 
to 0 in Spain for 2004. Under these estimates, the ‘neutral’ interest 
rate given by a Taylor rule varies at mid-2004 from 1.0 in Germany 
to 5.7 in Spain and Greece. So the ECB’s interest rate set at 2 per 
cent is too high for Germany and the Netherlands whereas it is, 
although at various degrees, too low for the rest of the euro area.  
 
 
 
 
10 BUDGET PERSPECTIVES 2005 
  
Table 1: Interest Rates, GDP Growth and Inflation Forecasts, June 2004 
Country GDP growth,  
per cent 
Consumer 
prices, per cent Differential
 (1) Output gap Interest rate target (2)
Germany 1.7 1.4 -1.1 -3.3 1.0 
France 2.1 1.9 -2.0 -2.1 3.0 
Italy 1.5 2.1 -1.7 -2.7 2.5 
Spain 2.9 2.6 -3.5 -0.1 5.7 
Netherlands 1.6 1.3 -0.9 -2.9 1.8 
Belgium 2.1 1.7 -1.8 -1.5 2.9 
Austria 2.1 1.5 -1.6 -2.1 2.3 
Finland 2.9 1.1 -2.0 -1.1 2.5 
Portugal 1.7 2.2 -1.9 -4.2 3.0 
Greece 3.4 3.0 -4.4 -1.3 5.8 
Ireland 4.0 2.1 -4.1 -4.2 5.0 
Euro area 1.9 1.8 -1.8 -2.3 2.6 
(1) Differential between the short-term interest rate (2 per cent) and consumer price inflation plus real GDP 
growth forecasts for 2004 (as of June 2004). 
(2) Defined as 0.5( 2.0) 0.5( )r g y yπ π= + + − + −  where g: potential output growth, π inflation rate 
and ( y y− ) : OECD’s output gap.  
Sources: Consensus Economics, OECD Economic Outlook, No. 75, June (2004), own calculations. 
 
There is no certainty that a single interest rate will lead a single 
public deficit to GDP ratio to be optimal for each country, 
independently of the strength of domestic private demand. Public 
deficits targets do not ensure that countries will fulfil the inflation 
target. A country with buoyant private demand may have both high 
inflation and a fiscal surplus. Such norms for deficits restrict the 
possibility for countries to run countercyclical fiscal policies. Each 
country of the euro area will see falls in domestic output if demand 
or inflation are high in partner countries (see Box 2). Conversely, 
the fiscal policy needed to stabilise domestic demand and to keep 
inflation under control, is such that an economy operating at below 
capacity should be entitled to run some government deficit whereas 
countries in a better cyclical position should run some budget 
surplus. 
Box 2: Stabilisation Policies and Fiscal Rules  
There is no evidence that different countries having the same 
interest rate should implement the same fiscal policy. Let us 
consider the model presented in Box 1. In order to reach the single 
inflation target, each country has to target a level of output such 
as: 0 /i iy π α= − . The central bank, considering the aggregated 
situation of the area, will set the interest rate as: 
0( / ) /r d ni iπ α σ= Σ + Σ ; i.e. at the level that allows reaching the 
inflation target with government budget in balance (n being the 
number of countries assumed to be of similar size). It follows that 
each country should be allowed to run a public deficit of: 
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0 0/ ( / ) /i i i i ig d dπ α π α= − − + Σ + Σ n . National deficits will differ so 
as to take account of different national cyclical positions and to 
equalise inflation rates. Ex post the level of output in each country 
will only depend  on domestic factors. 
Conversely, let us assume that each country is requested to keep 
its deficit at 0ig = . Under the central bank’s interest rate rule, 
domestic output levels are: . This level is 0( /i i i iy d d nπ α= − Σ + Σ ) /
not compatible with the inflation target. Each country must let 
domestic output fluctuations depend on internal demand and so 
will implement a sub-optimal policy. The country is negatively 
affected by rising demand or inflation in partner countries. 
The Treaty establishing the European Community mentions the 
necessity for Member States to maintain their debt to GDP ratios 
below a reference level (60 per cent), unless the ratio is ‘diminishing 
and approaching the reference level at a satisfactory pace’. In 
practice, the debt limit has not been considered since 1997, since 
several Member States with debt largely above 60 per cent of GDP 
(Italy, Belgium and Greece) were allowed to join the monetary 
union. However, the debt ratio is the relevant criterion to assess 
fiscal sustainability although it is difficult to define the level above 
which default risk emerges (public debt reached 138 per cent of 
GDP in Belgium in 1993 without any default risk emerging) and the 
optimal debt level.  
2.3 THE RATIONALE FOR MEDIUM-TERM BUDGETARY 
POSITIONS IN BALANCE 
The SGP requires euro area countries to present a stability 
programme at the end of each year. This programme must provide 
a macroeconomic projection and a budgetary plan for the current 
and the three following years. It has to target a budgetary position 
‘close to balance or in surplus’ in the medium run. So, the 3 per cent 
and the 60 per cent limits both turn out to be zero in practice.  
The rationale for a medium-term balanced budget has no clear 
economic justification. A country where private savings are 
spontaneously too low (high) may need some budget surplus 
(deficit). It is also reasonable to finance public investment through 
government borrowing and therefore some public deficit may be 
justified. The justification given by the Commission is that 
budgetary positions in balance will allow policies to react to normal 
cyclical fluctuations without breaching the 3 per cent of GDP limit 
(itself arbitrary). 
In a situation of relatively low private demand, running a 
government budget in balance may require such a low level of 
interest rate that the objective will be out of reach. From 1970 to 
2002, the budget was in surplus in the US only from 1998 to 2000 
(3 years out of 33); in the UK in 1970, 1971, 1988, 1989 and from 
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1998 to 2001 (8 years). This never happened in the euro area; in 
Germany in 1970, 1973, 1989 (3 years), in France from 1970 to 
1974, in 1977 and 1980 (6 years). The Pact intends to impose as a 
permanent reference a situation that occurred only rarely in the 
past. 
A deficit kept permanently at 0 per cent of GDP would lead 
nominal public debt to be stable and constantly declining as a 
percentage of GDP down to 0. But savers, in particular pension 
funds, need to own public assets, because these are long term, liquid 
and safe assets. If savers wish to own interest-bearing financial 
assets while private companies are reluctant to borrow, 0 per cent 
of GDP public deficits and debts may require low long-term 
interest rates, below GDP growth, which would not be optimal. If 
demand for bonds exceeds supply, a country that controls its 
domestic interest rate may cut it. But in a country not having 
control of interest rates, higher public deficits and debts are needed. 
Paradoxically, the independence of the central bank is a major cause 
for higher public deficits (Creel and Sterdyniak, 1995). The stability 
of a debt to GDP ratio at 40 per cent for instance would be a more 
reasonable medium-term objective. With nominal GDP rising by 
4.5 per cent per year, it would allow a cyclically-adjusted deficit of 
1.8 per cent of GDP. 
2.4 THE STABILITY AND GROWTH PACT AND 
ECONOMIC POLICY CO-ORDINATION 
The procedure of the stability programmes implies that 
governments are able to make reliable forecasts on a four-year 
horizon, and to commit themselves to implementing a fiscal policy 
in line with this projection. Governments are likely to be tempted to 
present an optimistic forecast, showing strong and sustained output 
growth bringing government borrowing into balance in a four-year 
time horizon. But what shall be done if GDP growth turns out to 
be lower than forecast? If a depressive shock occurs, should 
countries keep their fiscal policy stance unchanged? Should they 
stick to the forecasted deficits (meaning in practice tightening their 
policies) or should they rather maintain announced public spending 
and taxation (meaning accepting rising deficits)? Forecasting 
economic activity without errors is impossible in practice, even on a 
1-year horizon. Hence, the procedure of an annual submission of 
stability programmes generates permanent tensions between 
governments wishing to keep the possibility to adapt fiscal policy to 
the current circumstances and the Commission claiming for a strict 
fulfilment of the stability programmes.  
Fortunately, the horizon for budgetary positions to be in balance 
is a medium term one. This could have left room for a soft 
interpretation of the provisions of the Pact, where the medium run 
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target would have been indicative. The objective started to be more 
binding when a given year was chosen for government borrowing 
to be in balance (2002, then 2004, then 2006) independently of the 
cyclical situation. 
If the procedure were strictly followed, it would put a strong 
constraint on fiscal policy in the countries where fiscal deficits 
remain. For example, general government borrowing reached 3.3 
per cent of GDP in France in 2002. The fulfilment of the 
commitment made in Seville in 2002 to reach a balanced budgetary 
position in 2004 would have required the French government to cut 
borrowing by 1.6 per cent of GDP both in 2003 and in 2004: a 
contractionary policy should have been run these two years, 
independently of the economic situation. The lower output growth, 
the stronger the budgetary effort. Fiscal policy is necessarily pro-
cyclical in the path towards equilibrium.  
In theory, stability programmes put strong constraints on fiscal 
policies. In practice, coalitions have happened to emerge in the 
Council not to vote the Commission recommendations.1 Member 
States are not compelled to follow the recommendation as long as 
their deficit remains below 3 per cent of GDP. This is the ‘bad 
example’ shown by France in September 2002 when the 
government refused to present a stability programme showing a 
budgetary position in balance in 2004, and not even in 2006.  
The procedure is not economic policy co-ordination, but a 
forced convergence toward a priori defined norms of public finance. 
The Commission does not set a target of economic growth in 
Europe and does not define a strategy to reach it. Monetary 
authorities do not take part in the process. The cyclical position of 
the European economy, global or country-specific, is only partly 
taken into consideration. National stability programmes are 
evaluated separately, without analysing the impact they will have on 
partner countries. With the view that discretionary fiscal policy must 
be avoided and that automatic stabilisers may be allowed to run 
only in countries where budgetary positions are in balance, whereas 
efforts should be intensified in the countries where it is not the 
case, it is difficult anyway to see what co-ordination the 
Commission could organise.  
A satisfactory co-ordination process would consist in examining 
precisely the economic situation of the area as a whole in terms of 
inflation and output growth in order to set the appropriate level of 
interest rates, before analysing a comparison of the national 
situations in detail so as to set adequate national fiscal policies (see 
Box 3). 
 
 
1 The State concerned takes part in the vote, contrarily to votes on the EDP. 
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2.5 THE LIMITS OF THE BROAD ECONOMIC POLICY 
GUIDELINES (BEPGS) 
The procedure of BEPGs is not much reported in the press and in 
public opinion. How could Member States accept to bind their 
policies to comply with decisions made by technocratic committees 
without any democratic debate? The BEPGs refer mainly to 
structural policies. In line with the Lisbon strategy, they focus on 
‘making Europe the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-
based economy by the year 2010’. They focus more on the need to 
cut deficits than to support activity, advocating a preference for 
lower tax and public expenditure. In our view this should remain a 
national choice: each country should remain free to choose the 
organisation of its pension, health or education systems.  
Box 3: An illustrative Example of Co-ordination 
Six countries of the same size are assumed to form the area (see 
Table A). Column 1 shows the ex ante demand level, column 2 the 
level of inflation (both in deviation from the objective). The 
strategy chosen is that any gap between actual inflation and the 
objective should be reduced by half during the period. The 
desirable situation may then be calculated (columns 3 and 4). The 
average impulse needed in terms of output (+0.5) is provided by 
monetary policy (column 5). The fiscal policy answer adapted to 
each domestic situation is shown in column 6: countries A, C and 
D must run an expansionary fiscal policy. Countries B and F, 
where inflation is too high, need to run a restrictive fiscal policy 
and to accept a negative output gap. 
Table A: An Example of Economic Policy Co-ordination 
Initial situation Targeted situation Impulse  
Demand Inflation Output Inflation Monetary Fiscal 
A -2 0 0 0 0.5 1.5 
B -1 2 -1 1 0.5 -0.5 
C -1 -1 0.5 -0.5 0.5 1.0 
D -1 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 
E 0 -1 0.5 -0.5 0.5 0.0 
F 1.5 1 -0.5 0.5 0.5 -2.5 
* Monetary policy: r =-0.5 
Note: In each country, production is determined by: i i iy d g r= + − ; inflation 
by: 0i i yπ π i= + . 
 
National fiscal policies are under the control of three 
Community procedures suffering questionable economic rationale 
and insufficient democratic legitimacy. Public finance criteria 
become objectives to be fulfilled by Member States independently 
of any economic rationale. A deficit higher than 3 per cent of GDP 
in one country therefore becomes harmful, not because of negative 
spillovers, but rather that it endangers the credibility of the 
Commission’s surveillance process. 
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From 1977 to 1992, public debts rose from 30.5 to 60.5 per cent 
of GDP in the euro area. The cumulated increase reached 60 
percentage points in Belgium, 70 percentage points in Greece, 50 
percentage points in Italy. This led virtuous countries like Germany 
to ask for the introduction of a mechanism that would protect 
themselves from less virtuous countries. Besides national and 
European technocracies, financial and business leading circles 
wanted to use the creation of EMU as an opportunity to modify the 
conduct of fiscal policies in Europe, to stop and even reverse the 
increase of public spending and debts. So they advocated for rigid 
and enforceable rules to control national governments, accused to 
have, for electoral reasons, expansionist and extravagant biases. In 
this context, the existing fiscal framework cannot be justified by 
purely economical reasons. The Commission set a four pillar 
strategy – the 3 per cent limit, the medium-term budgetary position 
in balance, cuts in public spending and the avoidance of 
discretionary fiscal policies – to impose a liberal strategy: to deprive 
the national governments of any freedom of action; to ask them to 
undertake structural reform. The conflict between national 
governments and European institutions was ineluctable when these 
constraints would appear too rigid, i.e. in the first downturn.  
 
 The lack of fiscal discipline is not the original sin of the European 
Union Member States. Net public debt was only 20 per cent of 
GDP in 1979, before the surge in real interest rates; 36 per cent in 
1989, before the Maastricht Treaty. In the 1990s public debt levels 
rose mainly due to real interest rates being kept at excessive levels as 
compared to real output growth. Public deficits had widened to 5.8 
per cent of GDP in 1993. Member states had to run expansionary 
fiscal policies in face of the weakness of private demand and of the 
restrictive stance of monetary policy. In 1996 and 1997 the 
candidate countries to the euro area ran restrictive fiscal policies to 
meet the Maastricht criteria, which led to a surplus of 2.9 per cent 
of GDP of the euro area structural primary balance in 1997 (see 
Figure 3). After the launch of the euro, the area structural primary 
balance surplus declined to 1.2 per cent of GDP in 2002 and 
remained close to that level since then. 
3. 
The Stability 
and Growth 
Pact: An 
Assessment
3.1 1997-2000: FAVOURABLE ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 
European economies grew at a rapid pace from 1997 to 2000. The 
euro area public deficit shrunk from -2.6 per cent of GDP in 1997 
to -1.0 in 2000 (excluding one-off proceeds relative to UMTS 
licences). Lower interest payments explained 1 percentage point of 
the reduction, the effects of the economic cycle 1.3 percentage 
points, whereas discretionary measures increased the deficit by 0.7 
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percentage point (see Table 2). The cyclical improvement allowed 
public balances to move away from the excessive deficits threshold. 
Owing to faster than anticipated output growth (see Table 3), 
Member States easily fulfilled the objectives of their stability 
programmes. At the end of 2000, governments could announce that 
government borrowing would be in balance in 2004, albeit 
implementing fiscal reforms that were deteriorating public balances. 
In the stability programmes’ updates of late 2000, the euro area 
public deficit was anticipated to be cut by 0.7 per cent of GDP 
between 2000 and 2003 due to lower interest payments (0.3 
percentage points) and a positive cyclical effect (1 percentage point), 
while a positive fiscal impulse of 0.6 percentage points was 
expected. 
The European authorities (the Commission and the ECB) 
deplored that Member States did not use the cyclical upturn to 
bring more rapidly their deficits close to balance. Three reasons may 
be given in favour of the chosen fiscal policy stance. First, Europe 
should target an unemployment rate of 5 per cent – well below the 
Commission’s estimate of an equilibrium unemployment rate at 9.3 
per cent – which would require output to grow by at least 3 per cent 
per year over five years, instead of 2.3 per cent as implicitly stated 
by the Commission. If this objective for unemployment is credible, 
there was a negative output gap of around 3.5 per cent in 2000 and 
a cyclically-adjusted budget surplus of 0.7 per cent of GDP. No 
restrictive fiscal policy was therefore needed. Output growth would 
bring budgetary positions back in balance. Second, a cyclically-
adjusted deficit of 2.7 per cent of GDP stabilises public debt at 60 
per cent of GDP in an economy growing at an annual rate of 4.5 
per cent in nominal terms. A deficit of 1.5 per cent of GDP allows 
for some decline in the debt to GDP ratio. The euro area 
considered as a whole had therefore significant budgetary room for 
manoeuvre (of around 2 per cent). Last, a country with high 
unemployment, rapid GDP growth and no inflationary pressures 
may wish to see the continuation of this economic cycle for as long 
as possible. The government may prefer to implement necessary 
fiscal reforms (like tax cuts or lower social contributions) rather 
than slow growth with a restrictive fiscal policy, especially as there is 
no certainty that budgetary efforts would be offset by monetary 
loosening.  
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Figure 3: Euro Area and US Cyclically-Adjusted Primary 
Government Balance 
Per Cent of Potential GDP 
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Table 2: General Government Balances in the Euro Area 
Percentage of GDP 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
General government 
balance (1) -2.6 -2.3 -1.3 -1.0 -1.7 -2.3 -2.7 - 2.8 
Cyclical component (2) -0.9/-0.4 -0.5/-0.1 -0.1/0.3 0.4/0.9 0.3/0.8 -0.3/ 0.1 -0.9/-0.6 -1.1/-0.6 
Interest payments 4.6 4.4 3.9 3.6 3.5 3.2 3.1 3.0 
Cyclically-adjusted 
primary balance 2.9 2.6 2.7 2.2 1.5 1.2 1.3 1.3 
Notes: (1) Excluding proceeds relative to UMTS licences. (2) OECD Economic Outlook, No. 75, June (2004). In 
Italics, numbers of the Commission, Spring (2004) Economic Forecasts. 
Sources: European Commission, OECD. 
 
Table 3: Euro Area GDP Growth and General Government Balances According to the 
Stability Programmes 
 GDP growth assumptions (per cent) General government balance (per cent of GDP) 
 J99 J00 J01 J02 J03 J04 Actual J99 J00 J01 J02 J03 J04 Actual 
98 2.8   2.9 -2.1 -1.9    -2.3 
99 2.5 2.2   2.8 -1.7 -1.4 -1.2   -1.3 
00 2.6 2.8 3.3   3.5 -1.5 -1.1 -0.7 -0.8   -1.0 
01 2.6 2.5 3.1 1.7 1.5 1.6 -1.0 -0.8 -0.6 -1.2 -1.6  -1.7 
02  2.5 2.9 1.9 1.0 0.9  -0.6 -0.3 -0.9 -2.2  -2.3 
03  2.5 2.8 2.6 2.1 0.6 0.4  -0.2 0.0 -0.5 -1.8 -2.7 -2.7 
04  2.8 2.6 2.6 1.9 1.7*   0.4 0.1 -1.1 -2.4 -2.7* 
05  2.6 2.6 2.5 2.3*    0.3 -0.6 -1.8 -2.6* 
06   2.6 2.5     -0.2 -1.3  
07    2.5      -0.9  
* European Commission, Spring (2004) Economic Forecasts. 
Sources: European Commission, Stability programmes, authors’ calculations. 
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3.2  2001-2004: THE DIFFICULT YEARS 
Public deficits rose gradually under the effect of the economic 
slowdown in 2001 and 2002. Fiscal reforms or public spending 
programmes launched in 2000 contributed to raise public deficits in 
some countries (Germany, the Netherlands and Ireland). Deficits 
started to rise again in almost all euro area Member States. 
Expansionary fiscal policies were all the more needed to support 
activity that monetary policy was not very active. There was a 
slightly positive fiscal impulse in the area: 0.7 percentage points in 
2001 (mainly due to Germany) and 0.3 in 2002. The updates of the 
stability programmes presented in early 2002 were still counting on 
a significant economic upturn in 2002. All countries with the 
exception of France and Ireland were maintaining the objective of 
balanced or in surplus budgets in 2004. Euro area public deficits 
were expected to be cut by 1.3 per cent of GDP between 2001 and 
2004, with lower interest payments contributing to 0.3 percentage 
points and discretionary measures to 1 percentage point: 
governments were committing themselves to run restrictive 
budgetary policies, independently of the economic situation.  
In 2002, two alternative views were proposed. According to 
some governments, particularly the French, it was important both 
to support activity in the downturn, in the absence of inflationary 
pressures and to fulfil electoral promises of tax cuts. In the view of 
European authorities, the credibility of the SGP procedures was 
weakened by actual deficits well above the targets presented in the 
stability programmes and by some governments unwilling to 
introduce the corrective measures needed to reach their targets for 
deficits in 2004. But the warnings of the European authorities were 
inappropriate given the economic situation and therefore were 
hardly listened to. The euro area deficit reached 2.3 per cent of 
GDP in 2002 instead of 0.9 per cent as anticipated in the stability 
programmes released earlier that year (see Table 3). However, the 
deficit was modest in comparison with past similar circumstances: 
4.9 per cent of GDP in 1986 and 4.3 per cent in 1996. 
The early 2003 updates of stability programmes expected a 
negative fiscal impulse of 0.5 per cent of GDP each year in 2003 
and 2004 and of about 0.3 per cent of GDP each year in 2005 and 
2006 for the euro area. This was particularly worrying as growth 
prospects were uncertain, especially for 2003. Deficits were 
expected to shrink from 2.2 per cent of GDP in 2002 to 0.1 per 
cent of GDP in 2006, with cyclical improvement contributing to 
0.35 percentage points, lower interest payments to 0.25 percentage 
points and budgetary efforts to 1.6 percentage points. Germany, 
Portugal, Italy and the Netherlands endorsed significant restrictive 
budgetary measures in 2003, but France postponed them to 2004.  
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Almost all countries said they would reach the close-to-balance 
target in 2006. However, this was conditional on an annual 3 per 
cent real GDP growth in Italy. Germany anticipated a negative 
fiscal impulse of 1 per cent of GDP per year during four years. The 
French deficit was expected to remain around 1 per cent of GDP in 
2006, after three years of an annual negative fiscal impulse of 0.4 
per cent of GDP. Growth turned out to be significantly lower than 
expected in the euro area in 2003 (0.5 per cent against 2.1 per cent) 
and public deficits reached 2.7 per cent of GDP (against 1.9 per 
cent). Several countries (Germany, Italy, the Netherlands) did not 
implement the fiscal consolidation they had announced.  
Table 4: Stability Programmes, Early 2004 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Real GDP growth, per cent 
Germany 0.2 -0.1 1.7 2.3 2.3 2.3 
France 1.2 0.5 1.7 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Italy 0.4 0.5 1.9 2.2 2.5 2.6 
Spain 2.0 2.3 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
The Netherlands 0.2 0.0 1.0 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Belgium 0.7 0.9 1.8 2.8 2.5 2.1 
Austria 1.4 0.9 1.9 2.5 2.5 2.4 
Finland 2.2 1.4 2.7 2.5 2.4 2.4 
Portugal 0.4 -0.7 1.0 2.5 2.8 3.0 
Greece 3.8 4.0 4.2 4.0 3.8 3.8* 
Ireland 6.9 2.2 3.3 4.7 5.2 5.2* 
Euro area 0.6 0.6 1.9 2.5 2.5 2.5 
 
General government balance, per cent of GDP 
Germany -3.5 -4.0 -3.3 -2.5 -2.0 -1.5 
France -3.1 -4.0 -3.6 -2.9 -2.2 -1.5 
Italy -2.3 -2.5 -2.2 -1.5 -0.7 -0.1* 
Spain 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 
The Netherlands -1.6 -2.3 -2.3 -1.6 -0.9 -0.6 
Belgium 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 
Austria -0.1 -1.3 -0.7 -1.5 -1.1 -0.4 
Finland 4.2 2.3 1.7 2.1 2.1 2.2 
Portugal -2.7 -2.9 -2.8 -2.2 -1.6 -1.1 
Greece -1.2 -1.4 -1.2 -0.5 0.0 0.5 
Ireland -0.2 -0.4 -1.1 -1.4 -1.1 -1.0 
Euro area -2.2 -2.7 -2.4 -1.8 -1.3 -0.8 
 
Fiscal impulse, per cent of GDP 
Germany 0.1 -0.4 -0.7 -0.5 -0.2 -0.2 
France 1.0 0.1 -0.8 -0.7 -0.6 -0.7 
Italy -0.3 0.2 -0.1 -0.5 -0.4 -0.1* 
Spain -0.5 -0.4 0.6 0.0 -0.3 0.0 
The Netherlands 0.8 -0.3 -0.4 -0.6 -0.6 -0.2 
Belgium 0.0 -0.2 0.6 0.5 0.3 -0.2 
Austria 0.2 0.8 -0.7 1.0 -0.2 -0.6 
Finland 1.4 1.4 0.9 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 
Portugal -2.5 -1.6 -0.9 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 
Greece 1.0 1.3 0.5 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1* 
Ireland 2.1 -1.2 -0.2 0.2 -0.2 0.0* 
Euro area 0.3 -0.1 -0.3 -0.5 -0.3 -0.2 
* Own assumptions.  
Sources: Stability programmes, Fifth updates, end 2003/early 2004. Own calculations. 
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The early 2004 Updates of the Stability Programmes anticipated 
negative fiscal impulses in 2004, 2005 and 2006 (see Table 4). The 
German, French, Dutch, Portuguese and Italian programmes 
indicate restrictive fiscal policies of up to an annual 0.8 per cent of 
GDP in 2004 and 2005, which would not be sufficient to bring the 
deficits back to 0 in 2007 according to four of the programmes and 
is also likely to be the case for Italy. Only five countries look 
‘virtuous’ in terms of deficits: Finland, Spain, Belgium, Ireland and 
Austria. Belgium and Austria have, however, a debt above the 60 
per cent limit. From 2003 to 2007, the euro area public deficit is 
expected to decline by 1.7 percentage points, 1.3 points resulting 
from restrictive fiscal policy and 0.4 from the reduction of the 
cyclical part of the deficit. 
Table 5: Public Balances in 2004 
Per Cent of 
GDP 
 
Fiscal Impulse 
2003 
Fiscal Impulse 
2004 
 
Public 
Balance 
Structural Public 
Balance 
 J03 Actual JO4 OECD OECD OECD EC 
Germany -1.2 -0.4 -0.7 -0.4 -3.7 -2.0 -2.9 
France -0.2 0.1 -0.8 -0.5 -3.8 -2.9 -3.4 
Italy -0.3 0.2 -0.1 0.5 -3.1 -1.9 -2.6 
Spain -0.1 -0.4 0.6 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.6 
Netherlands -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -3.1 -1.1 -1.7 
Belgium 0.5 -0.2 0.6 0.9 -0.7 0.8 0.0 
Austria 0.5 0.8 -0.7 -0.2 -1.3 -0.7 -0.9 
Finland 1.2 1.4 0.9 0.9 1.6 2.3 2.1 
Portugal -1.2 -1.6 -0.9 0.7 -3.2 -2.1 -2.1 
Greece 0.3 1.3 0.5 0.4 -3.8 -3.8 -4.1 
Ireland -1.1 -1.2 -0.2 0.3 -0.5 -0.7 -0.3 
Euro area -0.6 -0.1 -0.3 0.0 -2.8 -1.6 -2.2 
Sources: Stability Programmes, end 2002 and 2003 updates, European Commission, 
Public Finances in EMU 2004; OECD Economic Outlook No. 75. 
 
If we compare the commitments made in the latest updates of 
the programmes with June 2004 OECD forecasts, it seems once 
again that most countries will not implement the planned budgetary 
effort in 2004 (see Table 5). Thus, it is very likely that deficits will 
still exceed the 3 per cent limit in six euro area countries in 2004: 
Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Greece and Portugal. The 
United Kingdom deficit will come very close to the limit (2.9 per 
cent according to the OECD).  
From 1997 to 2002, the structural primary balance of the euro 
area declined from 2.9 per cent of GDP to 1.3 per cent and has 
stayed at this level since then. The Commission did not  succeed in 
having Member States pursuing fiscal efforts after 1997: countries 
suffered from ‘fiscal tiredness’. The European procedures seem to 
have had little impact on national policies. However, there is no 
certainty that a higher surplus is required on economic grounds.  
 
 
   IN SEARCH OF AN APPROPRIATE EUROPEAN FISCAL FRAMEWORK 21 
 
 
3.3 THE EXCESSIVE DEFICIT PROCEDURE: 
IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPEDIMENTS 
The widening of public deficits in a context of decelerating activity 
led the Commission to initiate the excessive deficit procedure 
(EDP) for a growing number of Member States. In November 
2002, the Commission submitted a recommendation to the Council 
to initiate the EDP against Portugal (for year 2001) and Germany 
(for 2002) and recommended the sending of an early warning to 
France (for 2003). The Council adopted these recommendations on 
21 January 2003. In April 2003, the Commission sent a 
recommendation to the Council to launch an EDP against France 
(for year 2002). This recommendation was adopted by the Council 
on 3 June 2003: the French government, which planned a deficit of 
3.4 per cent of GDP for 2003, was asked to reduce it below 3.0 in 
2004, then to reduce the structural deficit by at least 0.5 percentage 
points a year. Denmark and the Netherlands voted against this 
recommendation because it did not oblige France to implement 
restrictive measures in 2003 and allowed the public deficit to exceed 
the 3 per cent limit during two consecutives years (2002 and 2003) 
without fines. 
The crisis erupted at the Council meeting of 25 November 2003. 
It was then clear that deficits would exceed the 3 per cent limit in 
2004 for the third consecutive year in France and Germany. The 
two “sinners” refused to undertake restrictive fiscal policies in “bad 
times” and to implement the significant cuts needed to bring 
government deficits below the 3 per cent limit (implying a cut of 1 
per cent of GDP in 2004). For the Commission and for several 
Member States (Spain, Finland, Austria and the Netherlands) 
strongly committed to the SGP, this was not acceptable because 
this was destroying the credibility of the Pact. The Commission 
submitted a recommendation to the Council asking France to 
present before the end of 2003 a budgetary programme including a 
reduction of 1 per cent of GDP of its structural deficit in 2004 and 
of 0.5 per cent in 2005. France would have to present in each 
quarter the situation of its publics finances to the European 
authorities. This recommendation did not achieve the qualified 
majority. It obtained 30 votes (Belgium, Greece, Spain, the 
Netherlands, Austria and Finland), while there were 30 votes against 
(Germany, Italy, Portugal, Luxembourg and Ireland).2 The Council 
adopted a less stringent conclusion accepted by the French 
government (Spain, Finland, Austria and the Netherlands voting 
against): France will have to reduce its structural deficit by 0.8 
percentage points in 2004 and by 0.6 in 2005, so that the deficit falls 
below 3 per cent of GDP in 2005; thereafter the structural deficit 
2 The State concerned does not take part in the vote.  
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will have to be cut by an annual 0.5 percentage points until the 
close-to-balance target is reached. The EDP was hold in abeyance 
and no fines imposed. Similarly, the Commission recommendation 
on Germany (a reduction in the structural deficit of 0.8 per cent of 
GDP in 2004 and 0.5 per cent in 2005 and quarterly reports) was 
not adopted by the Council, which required instead a reduction of 
0.6 per cent of GDP in 2004 and 0.4 per cent in 2005.  
The Commission considered that the non-adoption by the 
Council of its recommendations was not in conformity with the 
commitment made by the Member States when signing the SGP: 
procedures and fines are automatic; Member States have the 
obligation to adopt the Commission recommendations if the 
conditions are met. So the Commission brought an action before 
the Court of Justice of the European Communities. According to 
the majority of the Member States, the Council is entitled to take 
the economic situation into consideration. The paradox is that these 
countries did not suggest any reform of the SGP; they still – at least 
officially – agree on the principle of cutting public deficits 
notwithstanding the economic situation and do not try to improve 
economic policy co-ordination in Europe. The votes expressed in 
the November Council gave the unpleasant feeling to small 
Member States that there are two kinds of countries in the EU: the 
smaller ones, which have to obey the rules and the larger ones 
which may decide not to obey. But fiscal policy is needed more in 
larger countries than in smaller ones, as the latter may more easily 
use fiscal (like Ireland) or wages (like the Netherlands) competition, 
benefit from European subsidies (Ireland, Spain) or from low real 
interest rates, as compared to their GDP growth rates (Spain, 
Ireland, Greece).  
In the first quarter of 2004, the Council examined Member 
States’ Stability Programmes and noted, although deploring it, that 
the German and French Programmes were not fully conforming to 
the Pact. In May, the Council did not launch an early warning 
procedure against Italy, contrary to the Commission 
recommendation, which might be considered at the Commission as 
“un renvoi d’ascenseur” from France and Germany following the 
Italian vote of 25 November. Government borrowing is expected 
to reach 3.2 per cent in Italy this year under the Commission 
estimates (instead of 2.2 in Italy’s Stability Programme) and 4.0 per 
cent in 2005, with public debt at 106 per cent of GDP. In June, the 
Council agreed to launch the EDP against the Netherlands. The 
Commission proposed, at the end of June, to launch the EDP 
against the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Hungary, Malta, Poland, 
Slovakia, and Greece. So, five of the twelve euro zone countries and 
six of the ten new acceding countries are subject to the EDP. But, 
following the Commission recommendations, the Council of 5 July 
2004 allowed some delay to five of the new members before 
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bringing their deficits below 3 per cent: 2006 for Malta, 2007 for 
Poland and Slovakia, 2008 for the Czech Republic and Hungary, 
due to ‘special circumstances’ (‘structural adjustment in the context 
of their recent accession to the EU’). 
Table 6: Member States Under the Excessive Deficit Procedure, 
June 2004 
In 2004 
Government 
balance, per 
cent of GDP 
Government 
debt, per cent 
of GDP 
Inflation, 
per cent 
Current 
account, 
per cent of 
GDP 
Greece -3.2* 102.8 3.4* -6.4* 
Czech 
Republic -5.9* 40.6 2.8 -6.8* 
Cyprus -4.6* 74.6* 2.2 -3.7* 
Hungary -4.9* 58.7 6.9* -5.4* 
Malta -5.9* 73.9* 1.8 -4.3* 
Poland -6.0* 49.1 2.3 -2.3* 
Slovakia -4.1* 45.1 8.2* -2.5* 
Netherlands -3.5* 56.3 2.0 3.8 
United 
Kingdom -2.8 40.1 1.6 -2.1* 
France -3.7 64.6* 1.9 0.9 
Germany  -3.6* 65.6* 1.3 2.9 
Portugal -3.4* 60.7* 2.0 -3.9* 
EU-15 -2.6 64.2 1.8 0.6 
EU-25 -2.7 63.4 1.8 0.2 
Source:: European Commission, Public finances in EMU 2004 for government 
variables, Spring Forecasts otherwise. 
 
On 13 July 2004, the Court of justice did not condemn the non-
adoption by the Council of the Commission recommendations 
against France and Germany. According to the Court, the Council 
has a discretion in the implementation of the EDP. So, the logic of 
the Pact, which was to sanction automatically deficits above 3 per 
cent of GDP, is broken. But the Court stated also that the Council 
cannot hold the EDP in abeyance and cannot modify the 
recommendations for correcting an excessive deficit without an 
initiative from the Commission. So, the Council’s conclusions of 25 
November were annulled. The EDP appears to require an 
agreement between the Commission and a qualified majority in the 
Council. Without this agreement, the procedure comes to a 
standstill.  
 
 In July 2001, the Ecofin Council adopted the first reform of the 
procedures (European Commission, 2002a). The objective was to 
provide a ‘more effective surveillance’. Countries shall present their 
annual stability programme before 1 December. The assumptions 
for the world economy outside the European Union shall be 
provided by the Commission. Domestic policies have to be in line 
with the BEPGs. The medium-term target must fulfil the rule of 
balanced budgets. But it also has to enable a rapid decline in the 
4. 
The Reforms 
Proposed by 
the European 
Commission
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debt to GDP ratio and to provide room for manoeuvre for future 
ageing-related expenditure. The stability programmes will have to 
incorporate a projection of the impact of ageing populations on 
public finance sustainability. Member States will be asked to commit 
themselves to undertake in the course of the year the correcting 
measures necessary to reach the targets set in their plans. Member 
States have to bring cyclically-adjusted public deficit into balance 
and then to maintain a structural position in balance or in surplus.  
The reference to ageing populations is a way of putting 
permanent pressure on countries so that they reduce the burden of 
old-age pensions public spending or run budget surpluses to 
guarantee the future funding of pensions. But no country intends to 
finance the future rise in pension spending through a permanent 
public deficit, which would be impossible anyway. If a country is 
willing to finance the future increase in social expenditure through 
higher social contributions, there will be no impact on partner 
countries. Besides it is difficult to imagine how countries can fulfil 
the objectives of their programmes when GDP growth turns out to 
be much lower than expected. Should pro-cyclical policies be run? If 
it was applied, the text would deprive the national governments of any freedom; 
they would only be allowed to let automatic stabilizers play. This limitation is 
not in the Treaty. In spite of its important implications, the text was 
adopted by the Ecofin Council without any public and open debate. 
On 18 October 2002, Romano Prodi, EC President, said: ‘I 
know very well that the Stability Pact is stupid, like all decisions that 
are rigid’.3 Romano Prodi proposed (A stronger, better Stability and 
Growth Pact, 21 October) that economic policy co-ordination should 
be in the hands of a ‘strong authority’ which ‘can both apply the 
rules strictly to prevent behaviour that is off-course and adapt the 
rules to changing circumstances By its very nature, the Commission 
is therefore naturally suited to this steering role’. So Romano Prodi 
proposed the adoption of less rigid rules as the counterpart of 
stronger powers given to the Commission, although he did not set 
out how the Commission would implement these powers. 
On 21 November 2002, the European Commission (2002b) 
presented a set of measures to ‘strengthen the co-ordination of 
budgetary policies’: 
(1) The ‘close-to-balance or in surplus’ requirement of the SGP 
should be interpreted in terms of cyclically-adjusted budget 
balances, as estimated by the Commission. 
(2)  National structural deficits will have to be cut by at least 0.5 
per cent of GDP per year, even more rapidly in countries 
having a high deficit or debt, or ‘favourable growth 
conditions’. Once the close-to-balance or in surplus 
3 “Je sais très bien que le Pacte de stabilité est stupide, comme toutes les décisions 
qui sont rigides”, Le Monde, 18 October (2002). 
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requirement is reached, automatic stabilisers will be allowed 
to run but expansionary discretionary budgetary policies will 
not.  
(3)  To avoid the occurrence of expansionary fiscal policies in 
times of favourable growth, countries must run budget 
surpluses when they have a positive output gap.  
(4)  The Commission wishes to give its authorisation for a 
‘small temporary deterioration in the underlying budget 
position’ to the countries which undertake structural 
reforms in line with the Lisbon strategy. But these countries 
must have a debt well below 60 per cent of GDP and a low 
level of implicit debt on public pensions; they must keep a 
safety margin to avoid breaching the 3 per cent reference 
value. 
(5)  ‘The sustainability of public finances should become a core 
policy objective’. The Commission wants to give more 
importance to the debt criterion of the EDP. Countries 
with debts above 60 per cent of GDP will have to present a 
debt reduction strategy in their stability programme.  
(6)  ‘Member States should reaffirm their political commitments 
to the SGP’. They should endorse a resolution to 
strengthen fiscal policy co-ordination, including the 
commitment to cut structural deficits by at least 0.5 per cent 
of GDP a year, to reduce significantly debt levels when they 
are higher than 60 per cent of GDP, to facilitate the 
implementation of the enforcement procedures of the Pact.  
(7) The Commission wants to take account of the ‘quality of 
the public finances’. It wants to make sure that countries 
will reduce government borrowing through expenditure 
cuts and not through higher taxation, and that public 
spending will be productive. The Commission intends to 
strengthen its surveillance of Member States, to carry out 
country studies and to make them public.  
(8) The Commission wants ‘more effective enforcement 
procedures’ of the Pact: the early-warning mechanism 
should be activated more rapidly and more automatically; 
the Commission would issue early-warnings directly to 
Member States without a Council’s vote; warnings would 
possibly be sent to the countries undertaking expansionary 
policies in good times; the EDP could be launched against 
countries where insufficient efforts to bring public debts 
below 60 per cent of GDP are made. 
 (9) The Commission wants to have ‘a better communication 
through openness and transparency’. Hence it will publish 
in July each year a report giving an assessment of national 
budgetary developments and general orientations of fiscal 
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policies. Member States will have take account of the 
Commission’s report in the preparation of their budgets.  
The Commission accepted that the assessment of the medium-
term target (but not the 3 per cent of GDP limit) be made in terms 
of cyclically-adjusted budget balances. But these are difficult to 
estimate, since they depend on the measurement of potential 
output. The Commission estimates potential output with a 
production function (Denis, Mc Morrow and Röger, 2002). Capital 
is taken as exogenous: capital growth decelerates in economic 
downturns which lowers potential output. Labour force is measured 
as the product of the population of working age, the participation 
rate and the complement to one of the non-accelerating inflation 
rate of unemployment (NAIRU). The participation rate is also 
considered as exogenous, whereas it fluctuates in practice in line 
with the economic situation: a rise in unemployment will discourage 
a part of potentially active workers to search for a job. Last, the 
NAIRU is measured as a moving average of the actual 
unemployment rate. Hence potential output growth under this 
definition tends to reproduce past growth: euro area potential 
output is estimated to have grown by an annual 2.1 per cent in 
1981-1982, 2.8 per cent in 1989-1990, 2 per cent in 1993-1994 and 
2.5 per cent in 2000-2001. The output gap is underestimated in 
recessions while the structural deficit overestimated. Past slow 
growth will necessarily lower current potential output. For instance, 
the Commission estimated that there was a positive output gap of 
0.3 per cent in France in 2002 despite an unemployment rate of 8.7 
per cent in its Spring 2003 Economic Forecasts. If output growth 
has been stronger than 2.3 per cent a year in 2003-2004 in France, 
the Commission would have called for a restrictive policy to be 
implemented.  
Table 7: How Large was the French Output Gap in 2003? 
According to… Per cent of potential GDP 
French Ministry of the Economy -2.7 
OECD  -2.4 
EC -0.7 
IMF -2.1 
 
Reasoning in terms of cyclically-adjusted deficits leaves room for 
automatic stabilisers to work: in bad times public deficits may rise 
under the effect of lower fiscal receipts induced by weaker activity. 
A country will not be asked to raise taxes in downturns. Fiscal 
policy should not go beyond automatic stabilisers in the 
Commission’s view. But this has no economic rationale. If fiscal 
policy is thought to be totally ineffective, because households are 
Ricardian and they will anticipate future rises in taxation, then any 
attempt to run an expansionary policy will fail to boost activity. 
There will be no rise in inflation and no negative impact on partner 
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countries. In that case co-ordination is useless. If, on the contrary, 
fiscal policy is thought to have an effect on activity, then fiscal 
policy co-ordination is useful and there is no reason why fiscal 
policy should be limited to automatic stabilisers. Discretionary fiscal 
policy may be useful to strengthen or to reduce the effects of 
automatic stabilisers. If a given country is hit by an adverse demand 
shock, the single monetary policy will not be very proactive. A 
positive fiscal impulse will be needed in order to stabilise domestic 
output (see Box 4). The US government has run deliberately 
discretionary expansionary fiscal policies to boost activity in 2002 
and 2003, which added to the expansionary monetary policy stance. 
There is no reason why such policies should be forbidden in 
Europe. Last, the size of automatic stabilisers varies according to 
the budget structure (level of the tax to GDP ratio and tax rate 
progression, weight of unemployment allowances), which is a priori 
unrelated to stabilisation needs. The only rationale of the 
Commission’s view is the fear that if governments kept their 
budgetary powers, they would run over-expansionary policies 
permanently. Buti and van den Noord (2004), for instance, think 
that the difficulties of the SGP ‘have little to do with its intrinsic 
quality’, but reflects fiscal behaviour affected by electoral motives. 
But they do not explain why EMU governments should abandon 
fiscal activism while the US or Japanese governments continue to 
use it. They say that ‘the fiscal philosophy of EMU’s budgetary rules 
is to bring deficit close to balance and  then let automatic stabilisers 
play freely’. The French, German or Italian governments do not 
share this philosophy. One may regret that these governments do 
not clearly express their disapproval instead of signing texts which 
they do not intend to follow.  
The Commission wishes to play a stronger role in the definition 
and control of national public finances. But this is not in the Treaty 
and would have no democratic legitimacy. Until now, the 
Commission has focused on the levels of public deficits and debts 
at the expense of unemployment targets or growth prospects. The 
Commission does not clearly say if it would use strengthened 
powers to ensure the fulfilment of arbitrary fiscal rules or to 
implement economic policy co-ordination with a view to support 
growth in Europe. Is it reasonable to give more weight to the 
Commission? As Paul de Grauwe wrote (Financial Times, 22 July 
2002): ‘Seen from this political perspective, the Stability Pact is a 
vote of no confidence of the European authorities in the strength 
of the democratic institutions in the member countries. It is quite 
surprising that EU-countries have allowed this to happen, and that 
they have accepted to be subjected to control by the European 
institutions that even the IMF does not impose on banana 
republics.’ 
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Box 4: How to Stabilise Output, Government Borrowing and Public 
Debt: Some Simple Arithmetic 
Let us consider a simple model: (1 )y g d c t y= + + − ; wh+ere g is a 
public spending shock, d: a private spending shock, c: propensity to 
consume (equal to 0.5), t: tax rate, equal to 0.5. GDP level is 100; ρ, 
debt to GDP ratio, is 50 per cent. A fall in private spending 
(column 1) will lead to a rise in the public deficit and in the debt to 
GDP ratio ex post despite the effect of automatic stabilisers. A rise 
in public expenditure (column 2), hence of the so-called structural 
deficit, is necessary to stabilise fully activity. Trying to stabilise 
government borrowing (column 3) induces a large fall in activity. 
Moreover, cuts in public expenditure lead to a rise in the debt to 
GDP ratio because of the fall in activity. It is therefore impossible 
to bring the debt to GDP ratio down to its initial level through 
lower public spending. This is true since (1 )(1 )c tρ > − − . 
 
Impact of a fall in private demand 
d = -1 g = 0 g = 1 g = -2 
y -1.33 0 -4 
Government borrowing -0.66 -1 0 
Debt to GDP ratio, in 
per cent 51.3 51 52.1 
 
The Ecofin Council of 7 March 2003 and the European Council 
of 20-21 March finally adopted a text very close to the Commission 
proposal. This decision was adopted without public debate on the 
respective roles of European and national institutions, on a fiscal 
policy framework based on fiscal targets and not on output growth 
targets.  
The European Constitution adopted by the intergovernmental 
conference in June 2004, does not introduce major reforms on 
fiscal policy. The article III-71 allows the Commission to address a 
direct warning to a Member State if its policy is not consistent with 
the BEPGs. The article III-76 keeps the EDP almost unchanged. It 
states that the Commission proposes (instead of recommends) the 
existence of an excessive deficit (unanimity, excluding the vote of 
the Member State concerned, is needed to modify or to reject the 
proposal) but the Council makes a recommendation (upon a 
Commission recommendation) to bring that situation to an end 
within a given period (the qualified majority can accept, refuse, 
make proposals). The Commission wanted to be entitled to make a 
proposal which would have strengthened its role, but Germany, 
Italy, Poland and Greece refused. A separate Protocol recognises 
the existence of the Eurogroup but its meetings remain informal; 
the Eurogroup will elect a President for 2.5 years, but the 
Constitution does not give him any official role. A Joint Declaration 
reaffirms 
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…the commitment of the Member countries to the SGP as the framework 
for the co-ordination of budgetary policy and to a rules-based system. The 
Member States should use periods of economic recovery to improve their 
budgetary policy. The objective is to achieve a budgetary surplus in good 
times. The Members States look forward to possible proposals of the 
Commission to strengthening and clarifying the implementation of the SGP. 
Improved economic policy co-ordination could support the objective to raise 
growth potential.  
The declaration does not explain why ten countries did not fulfil 
the 3 per cent limit of the SGP in 2004, what is meant by 
“economic policy co-ordination”, how “good times” periods are 
characterised and it does not give evidence that a “budgetary 
surplus” is needed in good times. 
At the end of June 2004 (EC, 2004a) and in early September 
(EC, 2004b), the Commission made new proposals to reform 
economic governance in EMU. The Commission proposed a few 
changes in the SGP, but still without questioning the Treaty: the 3 
and 60 per cent limits must remain the “centrepiece of multilateral 
surveillance”. The Commission continues to confuse fiscal policies 
co-ordination with the fulfilment of arbitrary public finance targets. 
Moreover, the ‘shy’ attempt made by the Commission in September  
2004 to reform the SGP has been immediately criticised by several 
countries (among them the Netherlands and Austria), and by the 
Bundesbank, in favour of a strict implementation of the existing 
framework. Large countries show a certain degree of indifference as 
they wish to keep their autonomy and hence are not very much in 
favour of a well-designed Pact they would have to fulfil. The 
Commission (EC, 2004b) made seven proposals4: 
 
(1) An evolution rather than a reform of the Stability and Growth 
Pact. 
(a) The Commission wishes to ‘place more focus on debt and 
sustainability in the surveillance of budgetary positions’; to 
clarify the definition of ‘a satisfactory pace’ of debt reduction 
and to take in account the implicit debt due to the ageing 
population to evaluate the level of explicit debt. This means 
some countries will be in permanence subject to an EDP (Belgium, Italy 
and Greece), which will generate permanent tensions among European 
countries. Countries with ‘pay-as-you-go’ pensions systems (France, 
Germany, Italy) will also be placed under stricter surveillance. No 
figure is provided with this proposal, which is designed to facilitate the 
adhesion of the UK and of the new Member States to the euro area. 
(b) The Commission proposes to better take into account 
different economic and debt situations when setting the 
medium-term objective for each member state.  
4 At the time of writing, the proposals made on 7 September remain vague. 
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 The Commission recognises that the uniform medium-term 
objective of “close to balance or in surplus” ‘does not appear 
appropriate and lacks economic rationale given the increasing 
economic diversification in an EU of 25 Member States’. It 
proposes to allow for small deficits in countries with low debt ratios 
and/or high potential growth rates and to maintain the ‘close to 
balance or in surplus’ objective only for countries with high public 
debts. But it recalls that countries running a deficit have a great risk 
of breaching the 3 per cent reference value in slowdowns.  
(c) The Commission agrees to extend the ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ criteria for a prolonged period of sluggish 
growth. This is a step towards taking account of the output gap before 
blaming a country for breaching the 3 per cent limit. 
(d) The Commission wants to consider “economic 
circumstances and developments in the implementation of 
the EDP”.  
A less rapid adjustment may be required from countries 
breaching the 3 per cent limit because of a protracted period of 
slow growth or from countries with a low level of public debt. The 
Commission expects this will encourage countries to make more 
efforts to reduce their debts.  
(e) The Commission wants to ‘ensure earlier action to correct 
inadequate budgetary developments’, meaning countries 
would be required to run surpluses in good times. This raises 
again the issues of the identification of ‘good times’ periods and the 
economic relevance of running a budget in balance.  
 
(2) Co-ordinating budgetary policies. 
The Commission would like BEPGs to have a stronger 
influence on national fiscal and economic policies. It wished to send 
early warnings to oblige countries to follow its recommendations, 
and has been given this power by the Constitution. 
The Commission suggests that fiscal policies should be 
discussed at the euro area level in the first half of the year: BEPGs 
would then be adopted and Member States would have to present 
their Stability Programmes in line. In the second half of the year, 
each Member State would vote their budget in line with the 
decisions made at the Community level in the first half of the year. 
This would allow the Commission to influence national budgets ex 
ante, instead of making a judgement ex post. National Parliaments would 
see their power of decision significantly reduced: they would have to vote on a 
budget according to guidelines agreed at the Community level six months earlier. 
This would entail a significant loss of democracy. 
 
(3) Improving enforcement.  
The Commission underlines the need for ‘quality, reliability and 
timeliness of fiscal national statistics’. It advocates for tougher 
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surveillance by Eurostat. The main difficulty is that the definition of public 
deficit is partly arbitrary, which opens the door for creative accounting. 
The Commission (2004a) points out that the assessment of 
underlying budgetary positions is affected by the quantification of 
the cyclical component and one-off measures. It also asks for better 
information on long-term sustainability through a better evaluation 
of implicit liabilities (pensions, health care and education). But these 
two objectives are difficult to fulfil. First, it is difficult to provide a reliable 
estimate of the output gap. Second, social implicit debt depends among other 
things on the possibility to increase old workers’ employment rates, on medical 
progress, etc… 
The Commission expects that the effectiveness of peer pressure 
will discourage Member States from not complying with their legal 
obligations and would increase ‘reputation costs’. But the pressure 
would be ineffective if these obligations lack economic rationale. 
The Commission (2004a) calls for the introduction of national 
institutions warranting sustainable public finances. For instance, it 
recalls the proposal made by several academics to set up national 
Fiscal Policy Committees, where independent experts would assess 
and comment upon the sustainability of Member States’ budgetary 
positions. But debates on fiscal policy already take place at the national level 
between the government, the Parliament and economists. What would be the 
advantage of setting such Fiscal policy Committees? How would their members 
be appointed? By nature, fiscal policy always has to make trade-offs between 
several objectives: would it be advisable to look only at sustainability? 
The Commission has realised that it is difficult to request 
governments to implement restrictive fiscal policies in order to fulfil 
uniform and arbitrary rules. It tries to improve the existing rules 
albeit maintaining the 3 per cent and 60 per cent limits of the 
Treaty. But it refuses to accept the introduction of a “public 
finances golden rule”. It does not say clearly if the new functioning 
of the rule will focus only on public finance targets or also on 
growth and inflation objectives. The Commission seems to have 
abandoned its previous request for countries to reach and maintain 
structural balances ‘close to balance or in surplus’, but it does not 
clearly define a new objective. Thus its proposals tend to become 
less and less clear over time. The negotiations between the 
Commission and the Council will determine the implement of the 
fiscal policy framework. Perhaps this is the best solution, a sort of 
‘vanishing of the Pact’. 
The Statement made by the ministers of economy and finance 
on 10 September 2004 shows the hesitations of the Member States. 
The ministers say they do not want ‘a watering down of the Pact, 
but rather a strengthening, clarification and better implementation’. 
The twelve Members States which are now under an EDP do not 
say how they can reconcile this statement with their domestic fiscal 
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policy. The Treaty should not be changed. Changes in regulations 
should be minimal. The Council accepts: 
• to strengthen the preventive part of the Pact, with better 
discipline in “good times”, peer pressure at the early stage of 
budgetary deviations, more transparent growth and 
budgetary figures (as in the item 1.e of the Commission’s 
communication (2004b),  
• to enhance the focus on debt and sustainability, with a 
better control of the countries where the debt ratio is above 
60  per cent and of the countries where the future costs of 
ageing are high (item 1.a),  
• to have more indulgence in the implementation of the EDP, 
for countries that did not reach their objectives due to lower 
growth than anticipated (a part of item 1.d). 
The Council refuses items 1.b) (the redefinition of the medium 
term objective); 1.c) (redefinition of exceptional circumstances); 1.d) 
(more flexibility in the EDP); 2) (reform of the calendar procedure) 
and 3) (a better enforcement). We may think that some countries 
are less flexible than the Commission and refuse the death of the 
SGP; that some countries fear to infuriate the ECB with a too 
substantial reform; that some countries prefer an unsatisfactory Pact 
(with the possibility not comply to it) than a well-designed one (with 
a stronger obligation to comply to it). 
This debate takes place at a time when public deficits cannot be 
said to have generated any of the generally expected negative 
externalities and macroeconomic unbalances: the euro area public 
deficit is estimated to have stood at around 2.7 per cent of GDP in 
2003 and 2.2 per cent in cyclically-adjusted terms according to the 
Commission (with a surplus of 1.2 excluding interest payments), 
while there was an current account surplus of 0.5 per cent of GDP, 
inflation stood at 2 per cent and real long-term interest rates at 1.9 
per cent, slightly below real GDP growth. Another point is that 
financial markets have sent no signal, either through a rise in long-
term interest rates or through a fall in the euro exchange rate, as an 
increasing number of countries breached the 3 per cent of GDP 
rule, although these rules are supposed officially to be reassuring.  
 
 The need to reform the SGP has generated significant and still 
growing literature. Most authors focus on setting optimal rules in a 
national framework, but is it the task of European institutions to 
define optimal national policies? Some other authors try to define 
rules which would ensure some implicit co-ordination or would 
prevent negative externalities. Some others try to improve the 
institutional framework to ensure that rules will be met.  
5. 
Reforms 
Suggested By 
Academics
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5.1 SOME INTERNAL ADJUSTMENT ONLY 
According to Buti, Eijffinger and Franco (2003) the mechanisms of 
the SGP work relatively well. They make five suggestions to achieve 
‘stronger discipline and higher flexibility’. 
• Country-by-country medium-term targets. Countries with a 
relatively low level of (explicit and implicit) public debt 
would be allowed to have a medium-term deficit target in 
the range of 1 to 1.5 per cent of GDP. With a medium-run 
deficit target of 1.5 per cent of GDP, the debt to GDP ratio 
could remain close from 30 per cent (with a 5 per cent 
nominal GDP growth). With this proposal, a more realistic 
long-run debt objective becomes possible. 
• Improving transparency. The authors ask countries, or Eurostat, 
to publish real ‘structural balances’, i.e. corrected from 
exceptional and one-off measures (UMTS licences, leasing 
or securitisation operations, one-off taxes...). 
• Tackling ‘misbehaviour’ in good times. The authors want to 
prevent countries from stopping fiscal consolidation efforts 
during high-growth periods, as was the case in 1998-2000. 
They suggest that early-warning procedures could be 
launched against countries which have not sufficiently 
reduced their structural deficit (even if they have cut their 
public deficit). But this procedure requires an agreement on 
the level of potential output and on the optimal level of 
deficit. 
• A ‘Rainy-day fund’. Countries would put some money in a 
specific fund in good times, and would withdraw these 
resources in bad times. This proposal looks somehow 
awkward because such purely financial operations have no 
impact on government borrowing in national accounts. 
There is no difference between using receipts for debt 
reduction and allocating them to a fund. Thus the authors 
suggest a change in national accounts methodology, so that 
transfers to the fund would raise public deficits and that 
withdrawals would reduce public deficits. For instance, a 
government running a surplus of 1 per cent of GDP in 2000 
could transfer it to the fund. If there was a public deficit of 
3.5 per cent of GDP in 2002, the government would have 
the possibility to bring it down to 2.5 per cent with a 1 per 
cent withdrawal from the fund. But national accounts 
methodology must be based on economic logic and not on 
political arrangements. Policy-makers have to improve 
economic policy rules but they should not be allowed to 
change the instrument of measure.  
• A non-partisan implementation of the rules. The authors suggest 
that the Commission should be given more power to deliver 
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early-warnings, to determine the existence of excessive 
deficits, to decide on sanctions. Such a reform seems 
inappropriate to us, as long as fiscal rules are not better 
designed. A soft implementation of the SGP remains 
necessary. 
5.2 THE GOLDEN RULE FOR PUBLIC FINANCES 
It has been shown for a long time that it is economically desirable 
for public investment, which will be used over several years, to be 
financed over a similar period of time.5 Independently of 
stabilisation consideration, government budgets should be split into 
a current budget – including public capital stock depreciation 
related spending – which should be in balance and an investment 
budget, which would be financed through borrowing. The British 
government adopted such a rule, the so-called ‘golden rule for 
public finances’, in 1998.  
Several economists (Modigliani et al., 1998, Creel et al., 2002, 
among others) have proposed to import this rule into the euro area: 
the structural current government balance, i.e., excluding public 
investment, should be permanently in balance or in surplus. Their 
proposal differs from the British rule in two respects. In the UK, 
the current budget has to be in balance over a cycle: government 
borrowing may rise under the effects of both automatic stabilisers 
and discretionary measures in times of economic downturn as long 
as this rise will be offset by surpluses in good times. This is not the 
case in the above mentioned proposals. The UK golden rule refers 
to net public investment, while Creel et al. (2002) seem to advocate 
for a rule on gross investment.  
Let us assume that a country wishes to maintain public debt at 
the level of public capital stock.6 Public debt in real terms is 
determined by: 1(1 ) pD D r sπ−= + − − , where sp is primary budget 
surplus. Public sector capital stock is determined by: 
1 1K K I Kδ− −= + − . D K=  implies that budget surplus: 
1 1 1(p )s s rD I K Dδ π− − −= − = − − +
 
. The correct interpretation of the 
golden rule is therefore that the cyclically-adjusted borrowing, net 
of net public investment and of debt depreciation, should be at least 
in balance. 
According to the golden rule, borrowing may finance public 
investment, which is important in particular for countries where 
significant investment is needed. Buiter and Grafe (2003) highlight 
5 This view was developed at the end of the 19th century by Lorenz von Stein in 
Germany and by Leroy-Beaulieu (1891) and Jèze (1896) in France. It can also be 
found for instance in Musgrave (1939) or Eisner (1989).  
6 Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) also look for a condition that would assure that 
public debt remains equal to public capital stock. But they make the assumption 
that there is no inflation. Hence they forget debt depreciation.  
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the case of the new members of the EU. Under this rule, countries 
will not have to cut public investment to improve government 
borrowing. Lowering public investment is harmful in terms of 
potential output growth if endogenous growth theory has some 
relevance. But the rule opens the Pandora’s box on the definition of 
public investment: should the definition of national accounts be the 
reference, or should all spending in preparation for the future, like 
education or research be also taken into account, as proposed by 
Fitoussi (2002)? The rule also introduces a risk that governments 
increase public investment for short-term stabilisation purposes 
only.  
Balassone and Franco (2001) reject this rule in the name of the 
difficulties of measure. The rule implies that statisticians are able to 
estimate the cyclical part of government borrowing (therefore the 
output gap and its impact on public finances), public investment 
and public capital stock depreciation, in other words four 
questionable measures. But is not it better to use a fair rule, 
estimated with a low degree of precision than to follow a wrong 
rule, estimated with precision? 
A more fundamental criticism is that this rule defines the 
neutrality of fiscal policy, cyclical neutrality (only automatic 
stabilisers are allowed to work) and structural neutrality (public 
savings equals public investment). But a government may choose 
not to be neutral. It may wish to implement an expansionary fiscal 
policy in times of subdued activity or to run a restrictive policy in a 
period of high inflation. It may wish to implement structural 
measures if it thinks that saving is too high ex ante (which would 
necessitate a too low interest rate) or too low7 (in the light of 
demographic changes). The proposed rule confuses a criterion of 
neutrality with a norm for economic policy. As with the existing 
rule, there is no certainty that the fiscal policy needed to reach a 
satisfying level of activity in a country which does not control the 
interest rate matches the golden rule. 
As shown in Table 8, the four indicators give different results 
for public deficits. For instance, Italy’s structural deficit amounted 
to 2.1 per cent of GDP in 2002, but turned into a surplus of 0.4 per 
cent in terms of structural balance net of gross investment. There 
was a structural deficit of 0.8 per cent excluding net public 
investment, which turned into a surplus of 2.5 per cent excluding 
debt depreciation. 
 
 
 
 
 
7 This is developed in Kellermann (2004).  
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Table 8: Four Indicators for Government Borrowing in 2002 
Percentage of GDP 
 Cyclically-
adjusted 
balance 
(CAB) (1)
Gross public 
investment 
(PI) (2)
Public 
capital 
depreciation
Public 
debt 
depreciation
(DD) 
CAB 
+ gross 
PI 
CAB 
+ net PI 
CAB 
+ net PI 
+ DD 
Germany -2.8 1.7 1.7 1.0 - 0.9 -2.8 -1.8 
France -3.2 3.2 2.3 1.4 0.0 -2.3 -0.9 
Italy -2.1 2.5 1.3 3.3 0.4 -0.8 2.5 
UK -1.4 1.1 0.8 1.3 -0.3 -1.1 0.2 
(1) According to the European Commission. (2) Public investment refers to general government investment.  
Sources: OECD Economic Outlook No. 75, June (2004); OECD, National Accounts, Volume II – (1989-2001), (2003). 
 
Let us consider a country where there is a 3 per cent of GDP 
output gap in the trough of the cycle and where the elasticity of 
government borrowing to GDP is 0.5. Public debt amounts to 50 
per cent of GDP, inflation to 2 per cent and gross public 
investment represents 3 per cent of GDP with a depreciation of 2 
per cent. In comparison with the existing rule, a rule under which 
countries would have to keep their structural current budget in 
balance (excluding gross public investment), gives a supplementary 
margin of 3 per cent of GDP on average over the cycle (see Table 
9), but is not justified from an economic point of view. A rule based 
on structural balance excluding public net investment provides only 
a 1 per cent of GDP supplementary margin on average. In the 
trough of the cycle, this rule is more restrictive than the existing 
one. If debt depreciation is taken into account, the improvement is 
very small as compared to the current rule in cyclical troughs (0.5 
per cent of GDP) but significant on average (2 per cent of GDP).  
Table 9: A Comparison of Four Fiscal Rules 
Percentage of GDP 
Government borrowing 
needed 
SGP CAB+GPI CAB+NPI CAB+NPI+DD 
• On average over a 
 cycle 0 -3 -1 -2 
• In the trough of the 
 cycle -3 -4.5 -2.5 -3.5 
 
Should a rule better than the SGP rule be proposed? Fiscal rules 
based on government balance will never account for the fact that 
public finances are only tools to support activity or to regulate the 
savings/investment equilibrium. Any proposal for a European fiscal 
rule, under the control of the Commission, neglects the fact that the 
surveillance of public finances in EMU should aim at avoiding that 
a country generates negative spill-over effects in partner countries 
rather than trying to define optimal national fiscal policies.  
5.3 A PERMANENT BALANCE RULE 
In a similar approach, Buiter and Grafe (2003) and Buiter (2003) 
propose a permanent balance rule. The tax rate would be set in 
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)permanence as: , where g(p p p pt g r n bπ= + − − p is the permanent 
level of primary public spending in per cent of GDP, in other 
words the stable level of spending in per cent of GDP which would 
have the same discounted value than anticipated public spending; rp 
,πp and np are respectively the permanent (i.e., on average over a 
cycle) interest rate, inflation rate and output growth; b is the debt to 
GDP ratio. With this a priori constant tax rate, anticipated public 
spending would be financed while public debt would be stabilised. 
The stability of the tax rate is optimal since it minimises the 
distortions arising from taxation. 
In the short run, the budget balance would be: ( )( ).bnrrggd pppp −−−−−= π  A country could raise public 
spending transitorily, as long as its tax policy is such that no risk of 
default of the public debt arises. This rule leaves room for active 
economic policy in the short term. It would also allow countries 
with relatively higher real output growth and inflation (Southern or 
Central and Eastern European countries) to run a higher public 
deficit. A country having to increase public investment transitorily 
would be able to finance it through borrowing. An advantage of this 
rule is also that countries have to take future prospects into 
consideration. For example, a country where pensions spending will 
increase in the future should start to raise taxes now.  
This rule would be very difficult to implement in practice. How 
can the permanent level of public spending be calculated? A 
country may decide to run a certain level of deficit today, saying that 
public spending will be cut tomorrow. As is recognised in Buiter 
and Grafe (2003), the level of public debt is undetermined under 
the permanent balance rule. A country with nominal output rising 
by an annual 4 per cent, with an interest rate of 6 per cent and a 
permanent level of public spending of 40 per cent of GDP may 
chose to fulfil the rule with a public debt of 0 per cent of GDP (i.e. 
with a balanced budget and a tax rate of 40 per cent of GDP), or 
with a 50 per cent of GDP debt (i.e. with a 2 per cent of GDP 
government borrowing and a tax rate of 41 per cent), or with a debt 
of 100 per cent of GDP (a 4 per cent of GDP deficit and a tax rate 
of 42 per cent). The rule does not say how fiscal policy should react 
to a demand shock. Besides, if public spending in year t benefits 
mostly the generation of year t, it is difficult to see why public 
spending should be paid by former generations. If the increases in 
old-age pensions spending benefit those generations who will live 
longer, they cannot justify a rise in contributions paid by former 
generations. Buiter and Grafe raise the relevant issue of the 
intergenerational equity of public spending, but this cannot be 
ensured by an automatic rule. Each category of spending is specific. 
Last, as recognised by the authors, the rule sets an optimal fiscal 
rule at the national level. But it does not aim at defining surveillance 
criteria or a fiscal policy co-ordination strategy in EMU.  
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5.4 A PUBLIC EXPENDITURE RULE AND ACCOUNTING 
FOR THE QUALITY OF PUBLIC SPENDING 
Brunila (2002), among others8, proposed to add a complementary 
rule setting limits to public expenditure (excluding interest 
payments and unemployment allowances). This type of rule would 
be easy to implement and to control since the level of public 
spending is more easily controlled by governments than tax receipts. 
Member States would set a target for the medium-run growth of 
public expenditure and let receipts fluctuate with the economic 
cycle. This is the policy the French government had decided to run 
at the end of the 1990s. Countries with excessive structural 
government borrowing would have to cut the share of public 
spending in GDP. This proposal is in line with the Commission’s 
view, according to which Members States should cut public 
expenses instead of increasing the fiscal burden. 
This proposal suffers from two weaknesses. First, automatic 
stabilisers are allowed to work, but discretionary polices are not, 
which has no economic justification. Second, the appropriate level 
of public expenditure should be decided at the national level at the 
present stage of European integration. It is a social choice and no 
macroeconomic constraint should prevent a country from raising 
domestic public spending – pensions, health or unemployment – as 
long as it is financed by taxation. 
Several economists, like Buti and Giudice (2002), propose that 
the Pact takes the quality of public spending into account. Thus a 
country would be entitled to a higher deficit if domestic public 
investment is high, if it embarks on restructuring its public finances 
or if it undertakes tax cuts programmes. Conversely, countries 
would be blamed if they cut government borrowing through tax 
rises instead of lower public spending. This proposal introduces a 
new arbitrary condition. Should European authorities be entitled to 
reward countries that way? In our view, each country should remain 
responsible for the quality of its fiscal policy. 
5.5 FISCAL POLICY COMMITTEES  
Wyplosz (2002) proposed to establish a Fiscal Policy Committee of 
independent experts in each Member State. This Committee would 
be given the mandate of ensuring debt sustainability. Hence their 
task would be the regulation of budgetary policy. The Committee 
would set the level of government borrowing, while public spending 
and receipts would remain under the control of national 
governments and parliaments. After the ECB’s independence, this 
would be a new step towards leaving economic policy entirely under 
8 Brück and Zwiener (2004) show that an expenditure target leads to better 
stabilisation than a deficit target. 
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the responsibility of a technocracy. The Committee would have to 
care for long-run public debt sustainability, while the objective of 
output stabilisation will come in second. Unfortunately, Wyplosz 
has difficulty in defining debt sustainability. Two possible 
definitions are given: balanced budget over the economic cycle 
(which means zero public debt  in the long run), stabilisation of the 
debt to GDP ratio in the medium run (i.e. excluding cyclical 
effects), but Wyplosz reckons that it is impossible to set an optimal 
level for this ratio. The equilibrium ratio may change according to 
real interest rate levels or to demographic evolution. Wyplosz does 
not discuss the feasibility of his proposal. Changing economic 
circumstances lead observed budgets to differ from planned 
budgets. The Committee would have to control government 
policies in permanence and possibly ask for changes in taxation. 
Would this be acceptable for national governments? In an 
economic downturn, what would be the Committee’s trade-off 
between the objectives of output stabilisation and debt stabilisation? 
More fundamentally, should macroeconomic strategy be decided 
without democratic debate? 
Fatás et al. (2003) make a similar proposal: a Sustainability 
Council, an independent panel of experts, would assess at the 
European level national fiscal policies according to sustainability 
criteria. Their judgement would be made public, with a view to 
enforcing fiscal discipline through public opinion and financial 
markets. The problem is that sustainability is a vague concept, 
which makes sense as a long-term constraint only, so it will be 
difficult to use it to provide a judgement on the fiscal policy run 
during a year. It would require judgements on the level of the 
output gap, on optimal debt level and on the need of discretionary 
fiscal measures. Why would these experts be more qualified than 
others to have an opinion on such difficult and political problems? 
What would be the influence of these experts (possibly Fatás, 
Hughes Hallett, Sibert, Strauch and von Hagen) in the general 
public or in markets? Could these experts’ judgements replace 
governments’ responsibilities? For instance, in 2001, some 
European countries chose to support demand with a view to 
reducing unemployment rather than lowering public debt; in 2004, 
some countries chose to run higher than expected deficits rather 
than depress output further: can experts claim that these policies are 
not sustainable? Why would citizens be asked to vote for political 
parties’ representatives if fiscal decisions are in fact made by 
independent, non-elected experts? 
5.6 APPROPRIATE NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS  
Calmfors et al. (2003) propose that Member States shall be obliged 
to adapt national fiscal policy procedures to a common framework, 
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which would guarantee that ‘good decisions’ are made at the 
national level, independently of the European level. They design 
two possible schemes:  
• Each Member State would have to adopt a “law on fiscal 
policy”, which would set precisely the objectives for public 
deficits, debts and stabilisation. This law would indicate the 
instruments to be used for cyclical purposes. This law 
would guarantee ex ante national budgetary policies in 
conformity with European requirements. Is it realistic to 
maintain a priori fiscal policy in a very constraining 
framework, especially when fiscal policy is the only 
domestic policy tool available? It is an illusion to believe 
that a law voted at some point will be a commitment for a 
future government, elected with another majority and 
facing another position of the economic cycle, some years 
later.  
• Each country would have to implement a ‘fiscal policy 
committee’, as advocated by Wyplosz (2002). This 
committee would be in charge of maintaining public debt 
sustainability and output stabilisation, either by setting the 
level of government balance, or by setting itself the level of 
some taxes. This proposal reflects the view of those who 
think that democratically elected governments should be 
deprived of their authority, and that this responsibility 
should be given to a group of experts or technocrats. 
Wren-Lewis (2003) proposes to let the Subsidiarity Principle play 
its role. Each country would be free to establish its own fiscal rules 
provided they ensure long-term sustainability. The Commission 
would have to verify first that the rules ensure sustainability, then 
that the policy follows effectively the rule. Wren-Lewis does not 
specify what kind of rules will be accepted. Will the Commission 
agree on a rule setting public deficits at the level which maintains 
domestic inflation at 2 per cent?  
Eichengreen (2003) considers that the SGP numerical indicators 
(the 3 and 60 per cent limits, the “close to balance or in surplus” 
objective) are arbitrary. He does not believe in the importance of 
fiscal spillovers, but fears instead that chronic deficits can lead to 
unsustainable debts. He proposes to avoid this risk with the help of 
structural reforms. An independent committee would be established 
and would grade each country according to a set of structural 
criteria. The author gives three examples: centralisation on spending 
decisions, limited future pension liabilities, adequate labour market 
institutions. Countries obtaining 3 “As” will not be subject to the 
SGP procedures, because, according to Eichengreen, they would 
have no reason to run too expansionary fiscal policies. In practice 
these counties would currently be Ireland, Finland, Luxembourg 
and the UK. But each country would have a new incentive to 
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implement structural reforms. It is, however, difficult to imagine 
how Member States could agree to delegate some of the powers of 
their labour, social and political institutions to foreign experts. It is 
hard to imagine how in Continental Europe, countries very attached 
to the European social model, would accept a reform aimed at 
destroying this model.  
5.7  SURVEILLANCE  OF  PUBLIC  DEBTS 
Pisani-Ferry (2002) proposed that fiscal discipline should focus on 
debts rather than deficits, since it is an excessively high level of debt 
that may threaten the sustainability of public finances. He proposed 
to take off-balance sheet liabilities (like old-age pensions) in the 
assessment of public debt levels. But in that case, anticipated 
receipts should be considered too, like social contributions. The 
proposal opens the door to a never-ending process. But it is true 
that the notion of ‘public debt’ is basically ambiguous. The Treaty 
refers to an accounting definition of gross public debt, which has 
no economic meaning: public debt can be reduced through 
privatisation receipts, leasing operations on public infrastructures, 
etc. 
Pisani-Ferry suggests that countries may opt for a ‘Debt 
Sustainability Pact’. On a voluntary basis, countries could make 
public their off-balance debts; they would commit themselves to 
maintaining the debt to GDP ratio below 50 per cent and to a target 
for the debt to GDP ratio over a 5 year horizon. Hence, they would 
not be subject to the excessive deficit procedure based on public 
deficits. The proposal suffers from several weaknesses. The notion 
of ‘off-balance debts’ is unclear. The 50 per cent figure is arbitrary 
and has the only characteristic of being below 60 per cent. The 
proposal does not give a definition of the medium-term 
commitment: debt reduction or stabilisation? It does not mention 
how cyclical effects should be considered: the debt to GDP ratio 
deteriorates automatically in times of subdued activity because of 
rising government borrowing and of output stagnation. How should 
this be taken into account (see Box 4)? This proposal deals with the 
negative spill-over effects of debt but its does not account for the 
negative spill-over effects of inflation. A country with a low level of 
debt would be able to run excessively expansionary and inflationary 
fiscal policies. Partner countries and the Commission would be 
unable to stop it before the debt ratio reaches 50 per cent of GDP. 
Piloting fiscal policies with a debt rule is even less precise than with 
a deficit rule. 
The idea of a sustainability pact can also be found in Cœuré and 
Pisani-Ferry (2003). Each country would have to publish a 
‘comprehensive balance sheet of the public sector’ (including off-
balance elements), to prepare long-term plans providing evidence of 
42 BUDGET PERSPECTIVES 2005 
  
future public sustainability and to infer from these plans an 
operational target for the gross debt to GDP ratio. This target 
would depend on public sector assets and liabilities. A fiscal rule 
would then be announced by the government, which would ensure 
that the actual debt to GDP ratio would converge to the objective. 
This rule would have to be approved by the Commission and the 
Council, which would be responsible for its monitoring. It is not 
easy to understand how this complicated procedure based on a large 
number of long-term assumptions may be implemented in practice. 
It is also difficult to understand why euro area countries should be 
subject to such a procedure, contrary to the US, the UK, Japan, 
Russia, etc. It is difficult to see why there is a specific risk for debt 
sustainability in the euro area. The proposed procedure would put 
excessive pressure on future public health and old-age pensions 
spending while these types of spending can be financed provided 
that citizens are willing to pay for them. Besides, the proposal does 
not deal with short-term fiscal policies. Would a country be entitled 
to higher deficits in 2004 if it has announced the implementation of 
a reform due to lower public pensions after 2010?  
5.8 LOWERING PUBLIC DEBT  
Gros (2003) also thinks that the Stability and Growth Pact should 
put emphasis on debt levels rather than deficits, debt being the 
major risk to public finance sustainability. He proposes to add a 
new element to the excessive deficit procedure, by setting a minimal 
speed for debt reduction in countries where debt levels stand largely 
above the 60 per cent of GDP threshold. In practice, these 
countries would be requested to cut the differential between their 
debt ratio and the reference ratio by 5 per cent each year. Thus a 
country with a 100 per cent of GDP debt would have to bring it 
down the following year to 98 per cent of GDP. 
This proposal does not address the issue of compatibility 
between a priori set targets for public finances, and the necessity to 
reach short-term and medium-term macroeconomic equilibrium. If 
we let b, the level of public debt as a share of GDP, g: nominal 
output growth. The proposed rule requires that the deficit, d is such 
that 1 . The rule is similar with the 3 per cent of 
GDP reference when nominal growth equals 5 per cent; while it is 
less (more) strict under higher (smaller) growth. The rule is 
therefore highly pro-cyclical. It is less strict than the close-to-
balance or in surplus target for deficits: a country having a 100 per 
cent of GDP debt ratio will be allowed to run a deficit of 3 per cent 
of GDP under the assumption of a 5 per cent nominal growth. 
3% ( 5%)d b g−< + −
Calmfors et al. (2003) think the EMU should provide an 
opportunity to strengthen fiscal discipline. Saying that the major 
risk is debt sustainability, they suggest that the limit for deficits 
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should depend on public debt levels. Thus, the limit would be 0.5 
per cent of GDP for countries where debt stands above 105 per 
cent of GDP, 1 per cent for countries where debt stands around 
100 per cent of GDP, 3 per cent for countries where debt is close 
to 60 per cent, 4 per cent for countries where debt is 40 per cent, 
etc. This would be an incentive for Member States to reduce public 
debt so as to get more cyclical room for manoeuvre. The proposal 
raises constraints on highly indebted countries: Italy, Belgium and 
Greece. But for Italy and Belgium the opportunity of the constraint 
can be questioned since the level of public debt has a counterpart in 
a high households’ saving ratio. The constraint comes in addition to 
the objective of a medium run budget in balance, which implies a 
continuing decrease in the public debt to GDP ratio. The proposal 
follows a weird logic according to which a country having no 
control on its domestic interest rate may set arbitrarily the domestic 
debt level. Let us consider a country with an initial debt to GDP 
ratio of 60 per cent. In order to cut this level down to 40 per cent, 
the government may decide to run a restrictive fiscal policy of 2 per 
cent of GDP during 10 years. This will not lead to a significant cut 
in the ECB’s interest rate but is almost certain to strongly dampen 
activity, with a questionable usefulness.  
These two proposals seem to forget that the 3 per cent limit and 
the objective of 0 for public deficits already puts strong pressure on 
highly-indebted countries. With a nominal growth of 4 per cent and 
an interest rate of 5 per cent, a country with a debt equal to 100 per 
cent of GDP already needs to run a primary surplus of 4 per cent of 
GDP to reach a 1 per cent of GDP deficit and this implies its debt 
ratio declines by 3 percentage points each year. It is difficult to ask 
for more.  
The Commission (2004 a) recognises that it is impossible to 
define an optimal level of public debt. This level varies according to 
demographic or economic factors, but the Report maintains that 60 
per cent is an appropriate limit. It plans to differentiate the 
medium-term targets for public balances according to the level of 
debt. A country with a low level of debt will be allowed to run some 
deficit; a country with a high level of debt will be required to run a 
surplus to converge more rapidly towards a low level. For instance, 
the limit for the deficit may be: 10.5% 2%( 0.6)d b−= − − . A country 
where the debt to GDP ratio is 60 per cent will have a public deficit 
limit of 0.5 per cent of GDP. A country where the debt ratio is 40 
per cent will have a deficit limit of 1.3 per cent; a 100 per cent of 
GDP debt ratio will require a government surplus of 0.3 per cent of 
GDP. In the equilibrium, with a 5 per cent nominal GDP growth 
rate, the debt ratio will converge towards 24.3 per cent of GDP and 
the deficit towards 1.2 per cent of GDP. This rule has three 
drawbacks. First, what if the implicit target level is not the 
equilibrium one? Second, it assumes that highly indebted countries 
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will undertake strongly restrictive fiscal policies. Third, it is hard to 
control a stock variable (debt/GDP ratio) using a target which is a 
flow variable (structural deficits). But this rule has the advantage of 
showing that the equilibrium target currently in place in the SGP is 
too strict.  
De Grauwe (2004) proposes a two-level strategy. First, each 
country will have to define a target for its debt ratio (below 60 per 
cent). The target should be lower if the country has large unfunded 
pension liabilities. This ratio implies a specific target for public 
deficits (for instance, if the target debt ratio is 40 per cent and 
projected nominal growth of GDP is 4 per cent, the public deficit 
target must be 1.6 per cent). So, the country will be free to allow 
automatic stabilisers to work (and also to undertake discretionary 
fiscal policies), but the counterpart will be to run fiscal surpluses in 
good times. The 3 per cent ceiling would disappear. The rule has 
the advantage of being more flexible than the SGP. The level of the 
debt ratio can be chosen by the Member States. But it remains 
arbitrary. What will happen for instance if a country having chosen 
a 40 per cent target sees the debt ratio reaching 50 per cent after a 
long period of weak activity? Will this country decide to move its 
target at 50 per cent or will it be obliged to undertake long and 
painful restrictive fiscal policies to bring the ratio back to the 
arbitrary level of 40 per cent?  
5.9 TACKLING THE ISSUE OF AGEING POPULATIONS 
Old-age related public spending – on pensions and health – will 
increase under the effects of ageing populations in the EU in the 
near future. Yet this issue is tackled very differently among Member 
States (see Table 10). In some countries private funded systems 
prevail and public pensions will be little affected. Some countries in 
anticipation are postponing significantly the retirement age or 
cutting significantly the level of pensions (like France or Italy). 
Table 10: Net Increases in Age Related Public Expenditure 
(from 2005 to 2050, as a Percentage of GDP) 
Austria 1.5 
Belgium 4.5 
Denmark* 5.4–2.5=2.9 
Germany* 5.1–0.9=4.1 
Greece 11.5 
Finland 5.0 
France 2.1 
Ireland 4.5 
Italy 1.3 
Netherlands* 6.7–3.8=3.8 
Portugal 1.3 
Spain 6.0 
Sweden* 6.3–0.4=5.9 
United Kingdom 2.3 
*Some countries anticipate an increase in fiscal receipts. 
Source: European Commission, Public Finances in EMU (2004). 
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Some economists (among them Pisani-Ferry (2002) and 
Oksanen (2004)) suggest that each country should evaluate the 
implicit debt level of its public pensions systems and make it public 
in addition to financial debt. This raises three difficulties. First, what 
should the implicit debt include? Why not include also public 
education spending entitled to new-born children and the 
supplement of taxes these will have to pay later? Second, the 
estimated level of implicit debt relies on many assumptions on 
future retirement age and pensions levels. It may be strongly 
reduced, effectively or fictively, if the country says in advance that 
the level of pensions will be lowered or that the retirement age will 
be postponed (as France did in 2003). Last, the issue is not to 
aggregate financial public debt and implicit social debt but to see if 
fiscal policy is sustainable and optimal. If households benefit from a 
high level of social spending, well managed and useful, they may 
accept a high level of contributions. The burden could even be less 
heavy than having to pay insurance premiums to private companies 
with low efficiency or low reliability in health or retirement areas  
Many economists (like Delbecque, 2003 and Oksanen, 2004) and 
the Commission think that the SGP framework is justified by the 
future rise in pensions spending: public debt has to be significantly 
reduced now to ensure the future payments of old-age pensions. 
This is necessary for intergenerational equity reasons (all 
generations sharing the tax burden) as well as economic efficiency 
(avoiding imposing a too heavy tax burden on future generations). 
Let us consider an economy growing at 4 per cent in nominal terms, 
with an interest rate at 6 per cent, pensions spending rising by 4 per 
cent of GDP in 40 years. This economy may choose between two 
opposite strategies (see Table 11): 
• A ‘pay-as-you-go’ strategy (PAYG) would raise 
contributions in line with benefits in order to maintain a 
stable public debt. Contributions would then rise by 4 
per cent of GDP in 40 years.  
• A ‘tax-to-GDP stability’ strategy (TS) would increase 
contributions now in order to keep the tax-to-GDP ratio 
unchanged. Contributions would need to be raised 
immediately by 2.9 per cent of GDP. A surplus of 0.9 
per cent of GDP is needed today and may be reduced to 
0.2 per cent of GDP in the long run. Then public debt 
will be negative and contributions will be 1.1 per cent of 
GDP lower than in the PAYG strategy. The SGP would 
therefore be useful to impose the best strategy. 
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Table 11: Two Opposite Strategies to Tackle the Issue of Ageing Populations 
Public debt Government balance 
Primary government 
balance excluding 
pensions  
2005 2045 2005 2045 2005 2045 
PAYG 50 50 -2 -2 1 5 
TS 50 -6 0.9 0.2 3.9 3.9 
TS* 50 24  -0.5  -1.0 2.5 2.5 
       
PAYG 0 0 0 0 0 4.0 
TS 0 -61 2.8 2.4 2.8 2.8 
       
PAYG 100 100  -4  -4 2 6 
TS 100 48  -1  -1.9 5 5 
* A 2 per cent of GDP rise in pensions spending. 
 
However, four objections may be raised. A strong rise in EU 
tax-to-GDP ratios would depress output and there is no certainty 
that monetary policy would be loosened enough to compensate for 
this effect. The objective of the SGP is to facilitate fiscal policy co-
ordination and to avoid negative externalities, not to set optimal 
fiscal policies for each country. The TS strategy is not in line with 
the SGP: countries with low initial debt levels would have to 
accumulate surpluses (see Table 11), while countries with high debt 
levels would be allowed to run deficits: debt ratios would not 
converge. Last, pension policies have remained at the national level: 
a country may choose to raise social contributions according to a 
certain path (it is normal that the youngest pay more as they will live 
longer); a country may chose not to raise social contributions but 
postpone the retirement age. The public balance which will stabilise 
the tax-to-GDP ratio will be 0.9 per cent of GDP (if the country 
expects a rise of  4 per cent of GDP in pension spending); -0.5 (for 
a 2 per cent of GDP rise); -2.0 with no rise. Ageing populations 
raise important issues on fiscal strategies, but these cannot be 
solved in the SGP only. 
Some economists (Bishop, 2003) note that ageing populations 
and the shrinking of pension payments offered by pay-as-you go 
pension systems should be an incentive for workers to raise their 
savings and to hold larger amounts of a long-term safe asset such as 
public debt. Under this approach real interest rates would decrease 
and once they get close to the GDP growth rate, economic 
efficiency would require a rise in government deficit and debt. This 
is very unlikely to be allowed in the SGP.  
5.10 A BETTER CO-ORDINATION OF FISCAL POLICIES 
The establishment of an elected economic government for Europe 
could be envisaged with responsibility for monetary and fiscal 
decisions (Fitoussi, 2002). But this is currently a utopia. Democratic 
debate has remained at the national level; business cycles as well as 
institutions still differ from one country to another; it is impossible 
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to imagine a common government which will decide specific 
measures for each country: raising taxes in Hungary and Poland, 
decreasing them in Austria, raising retirement pension in Ireland, 
etc. 
The conduct of fiscal policies could be given to the European 
Commission. But we would face the same problem (how to deal 
with diversity?) plus the fact that the Commission has no 
democratic legitimacy. Strengthening the power of the Commission 
implies that all Member States agree on some fiscal policy rules (for 
instance, keeping their structural government balance at zero), 
which is not the case now. 
Fiscal policies could be placed under the responsibility of the 
‘Ecofin Council of the euro area’, but this would mean giving 
excessive power to the ministers for economics and finance, at the 
expense of other ministers and of national parliaments. It is difficult 
to imagine that the French government would ask for its partners’ 
approval before introducing the 35-hour working week or that the 
German government would submit its fiscal reform to its partners. 
Would this group of ministers be entitled to decide on the different 
reforms of pensions systems to be implemented in the Member 
States? 
A less ambitious solution would be to give the Eurogroup the 
responsibility of fiscal co-ordination in the euro area (see for 
instance, Begg and Shelkle, 2004). French Finance Minister 
Dominique Strauss-Kahn had proposed at the Ecofin Council in 
Dresden in April 1999 that the Eurogroup should first discuss and 
set the desired policy for the euro area, before setting the global 
objective for the area. The global target would be broken down into 
national targets in a second step. The proposal did not say if the 
ECB would participate in the co-ordination process. If the ECB 
and Member States agreed on explicit co-ordination to control 
inflation and activity, then the outcome could be similar to the ideal 
example described in Box 3. Interest rates would assure a satisfying 
level of aggregate activity; government balances would assure a 
satisfying level of national activity. If the ECB did not participate in 
the co-ordination process and if co-ordination targeted only 
government balances, then no improvement could be expected as 
compared to the existing situation. It is difficult to understand how 
the aggregate public deficit target would be defined and ‘shared’ 
between Member States.  
In an intermediate solution, the Eurogroup could have two 
objectives. The first would be to verify that no country runs 
excessive inflation, a too high external balance deficit or a level of 
public debt raising doubts on its solvability. Explicit rules on public 
deficits would be forgotten. The second objective would be to try to 
co-ordinate fiscal policies. An explicit co-ordination with the ECB 
would be better, but this is probably unrealistic today. So, in some 
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circumstances, a common macroeconomic strategy could be 
adopted. However, such co-ordination has two pitfalls. It requires 
unanimity between Member States (which may be difficult to reach 
in practice). It may exacerbate conflicts between fiscal and monetary 
policies. If all Member States need a higher level of demand, the 
best solution is to cut interest rates. If the ECB does not agree, the 
risk is higher deficits and higher interest rates, which is not optimal. 
In the event of differences in domestic economic situations in the 
EU, then a co-ordination without rules is difficult.  
5.11 COPING WITH NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES: OUR 
PROPOSAL 
Given the current level of European political integration, countries 
and governments must keep their prerogative on national fiscal 
policy, as long as it does not affect the macroeconomic position of 
the area. The surveillance of economic policies should consist in 
avoidance of any national fiscal policy negatively affecting the rest 
of the area. That is why we think binding rules should bear directly 
on externalities.  
Thus, the rule should be that each country may be allowed to 
define its domestic fiscal policy, as long as it does not affect the 
macroeconomic equilibrium of the area, in other words as long as 
domestic inflation stays in line with the inflation target of the area.9 
If there was an inflation target of between 1.5 per cent and 3.5 per 
cent in the area, one could imagine that Northern countries would 
be given a target within 1 and 3 per cent, while ‘Southern’ countries 
(more precisely the countries on a catching-up process) would have 
a target between 2 and 4 per cent. In such a system, a country hit by 
a negative demand shock would be able to counterbalance it 
through a transitorily more expansionary policy. Conversely, a 
country hit by a supply shock (inflationary pressures) would have to 
undertake restrictive measures. 
The European authorities – the Commission and the Ecofin 
Council of the euro area – would have the responsibility to check 
that inflation remains at the level set in each country, and possibly 
to accept some deviations and adjustment periods, in the event of 
specific or common shocks. The European authorities could also 
have the responsibility to check that domestic public debts do not 
put the sustainability of public finances at risk, or that no country 
runs an excessively large current account deficit relative to the 
9 Bofinger (2003) expresses a similar view. He shows that there is no link in 
Europe between public deficits and inflation and that, due to the common interest 
rate, inflationary countries enjoy higher output growth than low inflationary 
countries. 
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current account balance of the area.10 The crucial point is that 
surveillance can bear only on issues potentially leading to negative 
externalities between countries in the monetary union. 
Box 5: Compatibility between Monetary Policy and Fiscal Policies 
Let us consider the model of Box 1 and 2. In order to reach the 
inflation target, it is necessary that: i0 /i ig n r dσ π αΣ − = −Σ − Σ  at the 
level of the area. This is compatible with a situation of high interest 
rates and high public deficits or with a situation of low interest rates 
and low public deficits. A process where monetary policy and fiscal 
policies are fully compatible has to be found. The optimal medium-
run strategy is that the central bank sets an interest rate target, , objr
equal to nominal output growth, i.e., the lowest rate compatible 
with economic efficiency. Fiscal policies would be responsible for 
reaching the inflation target. Each country would have to target the 
following level of production: 0 /i iy π α= − , and consequently their 
public deficit would be 0 / obji i ig d rπ α σ= − − + . 
However, this organisation does not define the respective roles 
of monetary policy and fiscal policies considered as a whole. A 
satisfying level of global demand, compatible with the desired 
inflation-production trade-off may be obtained through a 
combination of high interest rates and public deficits, or a 
combination of low interest rates and public deficits (see Box 5). 
The second combination will induce higher private investment and 
therefore will be preferable in terms of medium run output growth. 
The compatibility between monetary policy and fiscal policies has to 
be planned. In our view, the best rule is the following: monetary 
and fiscal policies should set a common medium-term objective 
aiming at the convergence of real interest rates with output growth, 
meaning the lower interest rate be consistent with economic 
efficiency. If the long-term real interest rate is higher than output 
growth, this means that investment is too weak: monetary policy 
should cut interest rates and should be accompanied by restrictive 
fiscal policies in the countries where the cut in interest rates would 
raise inflation excessively. But as long as the real interest rate equals 
output growth, a country cannot be blamed for running some 
public deficit if this is necessary to support domestic activity. 
National fiscal policies should be in charge of managing the 
inflation-production trade-off in each country, under the constraint 
of a medium-run inflation, while monetary policy should target the 
interest rate.  
 
 
 
 
 
10 The argument is also developed in Bénassy (2003), who proposes a rule taking 
account both of public deficits and current accounts. 
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 The Pact aimed at ensuring that national governments would 
implement sound economic policies and hence requested binding 
fiscal rules to be met (3 per cent of GDP threshold for deficits, 60 
per cent of GDP threshold for debts, medium-term objective of 
close to balance or in surplus government balances). The economic 
downturn of 2001-2004 gave evidence that the SGP framework 
could initiate tensions in Europe, particularly between the European 
Commission and the big Member States which require more active 
fiscal policies than smaller States. These tensions are all the more 
useless as the negative spillovers that could potentially arise from 
excessively expansionary fiscal policies have not emerged. The 
existing fiscal rules lack economic rationale and therefore 
governments are reluctant to meet them and to support them 
publicly. 
6. 
Conclusions
There is currently no consensus in Europe on the appropriate 
macroeconomic strategy that should be adopted: some believe in 
the virtue of structural reforms and fiscal consolidation while some 
others still believe in the efficiency of active macroeconomic 
policies. European authorities have difficulty in imposing their 
vision of the conduct of sound economic policies on governments 
who hold a different view.  
Close to balance budgetary positions should not be the main 
objective of the fiscal framework today. Growth has been low in the 
EU over the last four years, exchange rates and equity markets have 
been very volatile, a number of short-term uncertainties have 
surrounded activity.  
Domestic stabilisation fiscal policies should be allowed. Each 
country should remain responsible for its domestic macroeconomic 
strategy. Placing fiscal policies under the control of comities of 
independent experts would result in a loss of democracy. The 
Eurogroup should aim at avoiding the emergence of negative 
spillovers from countries running excessive inflation, balance of 
payments current account deficits or default risks. The Eurogroup 
could also implement explicit fiscal policy co-ordination, if Member 
States were able to reach a common agreement.  
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RELATIVE  INCOME 
POVERTY  RISK:  
WHAT IRELAND  CAN  
LEARN FROM  THE  
BEST-PERFORMING  
COUNTRIES  
Tim Callan and Brian Nolan 
 While Ireland’s income per head has converged rapidly with the 
EU average, the numbers falling below relative income thresholds 
such as 50 per cent or 60 per cent of median income here remains 
high compared with many other EU countries. Why is this, and 
what can Ireland learn from the experience of EU countries which 
have sustained much lower percentages below such thresholds? 
Such questions are important to Ireland’s engagement with the 
Lisbon strategy adopted by the European Union in 2000, which inter 
alia set the goal of making a decisive impact on the eradication of 
poverty and social exclusion by 2010. To help achieve this what is 
termed the “open method of coordination” is being employed, 
whereby member states are to identify and exchange information on 
best practice by reference to an agreed set of indicators of social 
inclusion. These indicators, adopted at the Laeken European 
Council meeting in December 2001, include the numbers falling 
below various proportions of median income.  
1.
Introduction
Falling below such relative income thresholds is not enough in 
itself to constitute being in poverty. A range of studies for Ireland 
and other EU countries has shown that only some of those towards 
the bottom of the income distribution display high levels of 
deprivation, are experiencing what would commonly be thought of 
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as poverty in their society.1 For this reason the official Irish 
National Anti-Poverty Strategy targets focus on a measure of 
poverty (developed at the ESRI) which incorporates both being 
below such income thresholds and experiencing rather basic forms 
of deprivation – termed “consistent poverty” (see for example 
Whelan et al, 2003). However, those falling below relative income 
thresholds are certainly at an enhanced risk of poverty. This is 
reflected in the EU’s Laeken indicators regarding them as measures 
of “the risk of poverty” rather than of poverty per se (see Box). 
Countries which have the lowest percentage of their populations 
falling below such relative income thresholds also appear to have 
been relatively successful in promoting social inclusion on a range 
of other dimensions, so it is worth trying to learn from their 
experiences.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reports on how 
Irish relative income poverty rates compare with those of other EU 
countries, including comparisons for the elderly and children as well 
as the total population. Section 3 looks at possible explanations for 
the gap between Irish poverty risk rates and those in the best 
performing countries. For example, are higher Irish rates due to the 
demographic factors, with groups which usually have above-average 
rates being particularly prevalent in Ireland? Or to what extent do 
differences in the tax and benefit systems contribute to explaining 
the gap? Section 4 turns to policies on child income support, 
documenting recent shifts in policy. We re-examine how Irish child 
income supports compare with EU countries where child income 
poverty is low, and consider how the impact of recent policy shifts 
can be assessed. The main conclusions are drawn together in 
Section 5. 
Measuring Progress towards Social Inclusion – The Laeken 
Indicators 
In December 2001, the European Council held at Laeken in 
Belgium adopted a set of commonly agreed and defined indicators 
of social inclusion, which will in the future play a central role in 
monitoring the performance of the Member States in promoting 
social inclusion (see Atkinson et al., 2002, 2004 for a discussion). 
These indicators are intended to allow the Member States and the 
Commission to monitor progress towards the goal set by the 
European Council of Lisbon of making a decisive impact on the 
eradication of poverty by 2010. They were developed by the Social 
Protection Committee and its Indicators Sub-Group, which 
recommended that a specific set of Primary and Secondary 
Indicators be employed. The first of the Primary Indicators is the 
percentage falling below 60 per cent of median income in the 
country in question. The Indicators Sub-Group emphasised that this 
was to be seen as a measure of people who are “at risk of being 
 
1 See for example Nolan and Whelan (1996); Layte, Maître, Nolan and Whelan 
(2002); Whelan, Layte and Maître (forthcoming).   
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poor”, not a measure of poverty – and for that reason it is labelled 
the “low income rate”.  
It is complemented by other Primary indicators also based on 
this relative income threshold. One measures the depth of the 
shortfall for those below the 60 per cent threshold. Another 
measures low income persistence, that is the number of people 
below 60 per cent of median income who had also been below that 
income line for at least two of the previous three years.  
The Secondary indicators also include the numbers below 
alternative relative income thresholds, set at 40 per cent, 50 per cent 
and 70 per cent of the median. They do in addition include a “low 
income rate” where the income threshold is anchored at a moment 
in time and indexed to price increases rather than to median income 
as with the purely relative lines. However, in tracking low income 
the dominant focus in the agreed social inclusion indicators is 
clearly on relative income thresholds. Since performance vis-à-vis 
those thresholds is going to receive a great deal of attention at EU 
level, it is all the more important to understand the factors 
underlying Ireland’s ranking in terms of this “low income” or 
relative income poverty rate. 
 
 So where does Ireland rank in terms of the rate of relative income 
poverty risk? The obvious place to start in answering this question is 
with the figures produced by Eurostat from the European 
Community Household Panel Survey, recently presented among the 
agreed indicators of social inclusion in the Joint Report on Social 
Inclusion (2004). We reproduce in Table 1 the figures shown there 
for percentage falling below 60 per cent of median income in each 
of the EU Member States, for 1995 and every two years thereafter 
to 2001. 
2. 
 Where Does 
Ireland Stand?
Table 1: Percentage of Persons below 60 Per Cent of Median Equivalised Income, Modified 
OECD Scale, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001 
 Percentage of persons below 60 per cent of median 
 Country 1995 Country  1997  Country 1999 Country  2001 
Sweden n.a. Sweden 8 Sweden 8 Sweden 9 
Finland n.a. Finland 8 Denmark 10 Denmark 10 
Denmark 10 Denmark 10 Germany 11 Germany 11 
Netherlands 11 Netherlands 10 Netherlands 11 Netherlands 11 
Luxembourg 12 Luxembourg 11 Finland 11 Finland 11 
Austria 13 Germany 12 Austria 12 Luxembourg 12 
Germany 15 Austria 13 Luxembourg 13 Austria 12 
France 15 Belgium 14 Belgium 13 Belgium 13 
Belgium 16 France 15 France 15 France 15 
Spain 19 UK 18 Italy 18 UK 17 
Ireland 19 Italy 19 UK 19 Spain 19 
UK 20 Ireland 19 Spain 19 Italy 19 
Italy 20 Spain 20 Ireland 19 Greece 20 
Greece 22 Greece 21 Greece 21 Portugal 20 
Portugal 23 Portugal 22 Portugal 21 Ireland 21 
        
EU15 17 EU15 16 EU15 15 EU15 15 
Source:  Joint Report on Social Inclusion  (2004), Statistical Annex, Table 1.  
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Countries are ranked by the relative income poverty rate (60 per 
cent of median equivalised income) for each year, and the countries 
with the lowest rates (including ties for 3rd place) are highlighted in 
bold at the top of the table. Denmark and the Netherlands have 
been consistently among the countries with the lowest relative 
income poverty risk rates over the period, and it is these countries 
which are the main comparators in our later analysis. The group also 
includes Sweden, which has had the lowest rate for all the years for 
which it is included, Finland, and, in more recent years, Germany. 
Relative income poverty rates for this group were between 8 and 11 
per cent over the period, well below the EU average. 
Ireland’s relative income poverty rate (also in bold in Table 1) 
has been above the EU average of 15 to 17 per cent throughout. In 
the mid-1990s the Irish rate of 19 per cent was close to that in the 
UK, Spain and Italy, with somewhat higher rates in Greece and 
Portugal. By 2001 a rise in the Irish rate to 21 per cent, combined 
with falls in the Greek and Portuguese rates made Ireland the 
country with the highest relative income poverty risk rate in the EU-
15.  
The picture has been rather different at lower cut-offs. In 1997, 
for example, at 40 per cent of median equivalised income, the Irish 
relative income poverty rate of 2 per cent was the lowest in the EU 
and the Irish poverty rate of 10 per cent at half of median income 
was below the EU average. But by 2001 (Table 2), Ireland has the 
highest proportions of persons falling below relative income 
poverty cut-offs at 50 per cent, 60 per cent and 70 per cent of 
median income. At the lowest, 40 per cent cut-off, the proportion 
of persons falling below the cut-off was the same (5 per cent) in 
Ireland as the EU average. 
Table 2: Ranking of EU-15 Countries  by Extent of Relative Income Poverty at Alternative 
Income Cut-offs, 2001 
 
Percentage of persons living in households with disposable income per adult equivalent 
below  
 
Country 40 per cent 
of median 
Country 
 
50 per cent  
of median 
Country 
 
60 per cent 
of median 
Country 
 
70 pr cent 
of median 
Belgium 2 Belgium 6 Sweden 10 Sweden 18 
Denmark 2 Germany  6 Denmark 11 Denmark 19 
Finland 2 Luxembourg 6 Germany  11 Germany  19 
Germany  3 Netherlands 6 Netherlands 11 Netherlands 19 
Luxembourg 3 Austria 6 Finland 11 Austria 19 
Austria 3 Finland 6 Luxembourg 12 Finland 20 
Sweden 3 Sweden 6 Austria 12 Belgium 21 
France 4 Denmark 7 Belgium 13 Luxembourg 21 
Netherlands 4 France 9 France 15 France 23 
Ireland 5 UK 11 UK 17 UK 26 
UK 5 Spain 13 Spain 19 Spain 27 
Portugal 6 Italy 13 Italy 19 Italy 27 
Spain 7 Portugal 13 Greece 20 Greece 28 
Greece 8 Greece 14 Portugal 20 Portugal 28 
Italy 8 Ireland 15 Ireland 21 Ireland 29 
        
EU-15 average 5  9  15  23 
Source:  Joint Report on Social Inclusion (2004), Statistical Annex.  
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Table 3 gives relative income poverty risk rates in 2001 for 
different age groupings: under 16s, over 16s (including the elderly) 
and the elderly defined as over 65s. Interestingly, while Denmark 
and the Netherlands have the same overall rate of income poverty, 
they have quite different rates for children and the elderly – neither 
is close to best performance in both fields.2 This distinction is held 
by Sweden, which has poverty risk rates close to the best for  
children, adults and the elderly. Denmark has the best results on 
children, with only 5 per cent of children living in households below 
60 per cent of median equivalised income. Ireland’s rate is 26 per 
cent, one of the highest in the EU.  
The lowest rate of relative income poverty for the elderly is in 
the Netherlands, where only 4 per cent of elderly individuals live in 
households below the cut-off income. The EU-average rate is 15 
per cent, but the rate in Ireland is 44 per cent – substantially higher 
than in any other country. This raises questions about the causes of 
poverty among the elderly and the best means of tackling poverty 
among older persons, which are worthy of a substantial study in 
themselves, but cannot be tackled here. 
Table 3: Relative Income Poverty Rates (60 per cent of median equivalised income) by Age 
Category, EU-15, 2001 
Age Less than 
16 years 
Country 16 years 
and over 
Country 65 years 
and over
Country Total 
Denmark 5 Netherlands 10 Netherlands 4 Sweden 10 
Finland 6 Sweden 11 Luxembourg  7 Denmark 11 
Sweden 10 Germany 11 Sweden 9 Finland 11 
Belgium 12 Luxembourg  11 Germany 12 Germany 11 
Austria 13 Denmark 12 Italy 17 Netherlands 11 
Germany 14 Austria 12 France 19 Austria 12 
Netherlands 16 Finland 13 Spain 22 Luxembourg  12 
Greece 18 Belgium 14 Finland 23 Belgium 13 
France 18 France 15 Austria 24 France 15 
Luxembourg  18 UK 15 UK 24 UK 17 
UK 24 Italy 18 Belgium 26 Italy 19 
Italy 25 Spain 18 Denmark 29 Spain 19 
Spain 26 Portugal 18 Portugal 30 Greece 20 
Ireland 26 Ireland 20 Greece 33 Portugal 20 
Portugal 27 Greece 21 Ireland 44 Ireland 21 
        
EU-15 19 EU-15 15 EU-15 19 EU-15 15 
 
2 Some questions have been raised about the accuracy of the figure for relative 
income poverty for the elderly in Denmark, but this is unlikely to affect the 
interpretation given here. 
Note: Modified OECD equivalence scale (1 for first adult, 0.5 for other adults, 0.3 for children). 
Source: Joint Report on Social Inclusion (2004), Statistical Annex.  
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DEMOGRAPHIC STRUCTURE, LABOUR MARKET AND 
HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION 
3. 
Why is Relative 
Income Poverty 
So High in 
Ireland?
Biewen and Jenkins (2002) point out that when a low poverty rate is 
observed in a particular country, this may arise:  
(a) because relatively few individuals in this country have 
characteristics usually associated with poverty (e.g., 
unemployment, illness or lone parenthood) or 
(b) because, although there are many individuals with 
characteristics linked to a high risk of poverty, the risk in 
that country, given those characteristics, is itself low relative 
to the risk in other countries. 
It is possible to distinguish between these possibilities using 
comparative analysis of harmonised household survey data for 
different countries and focusing on the numbers falling below 
relative income poverty lines. Callan et al. (2004) use European 
Community Household Panel data for 5 countries: the Netherlands, 
Ireland, Germany, the UK and Portugal to explore the significance 
of structural differences in the labour market, demographic profile 
and household composition for the extent of relative income 
poverty. The method employed is straightforward. The question 
asked is, in effect, what the relative income poverty rate in these 
countries would be if they all had the same unemployment rate, or 
the same age structure, or the same household structure, and 
nothing else changed. To derive those results, actual survey data are 
simply reweighted to shrink or expand the size of the group in 
question, without changing any of their circumstances or the 
situation of the rest of the sample – most importantly, their 
incomes. 
An overall conclusion from these simulation exercises is that 
differences in age profiles, patterns of labour force participation, 
and household composition across the countries examined do not 
in themselves appear to play the major role in explaining the 
substantial variation observed in relative income poverty rates. Thus 
for Ireland,3 with 20 per cent of households below 60 per cent of 
median equivalised income compared with only 12 per cent in the 
Netherlands, simulating the impact of imposing the Dutch age, 
labour force or household composition structures did not close that 
gap – indeed it sometimes widened it. This reflects, among other 
things, a fundamental and often under-appreciated feature of 
relative income thresholds themselves: in effect, reducing the 
proportion in high-poverty-risk groups does not necessarily reduce 
the overall poverty rate as measured by such thresholds, because the 
standard against which poverty is being assessed is also affected. 
The simulations thus displayed a much stronger influence of 
imposing the Dutch structures on the composition of the group 
 
3 These figures are on a household basis and thus differ slightly from those in 
Section 2. 
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found below relative income thresholds than on the size of that 
group. This is still very important for understanding the factors 
producing income poverty risk and designing strategic responses, 
but it does not explain very much of the persistent gap that is 
observed between relative income poverty rates in the countries 
concerned. 
This result need not necessarily hold if the set of countries 
studied were expanded or changed, but it is worth noting that it is 
entirely consistent with the results from a similar exercise carried 
out with data from the Luxembourg Income study. Rainwater and 
Smeeding (1997) employ a similar simulation method based on 
reweighting the survey samples. Their analysis covers the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the UK, 
Australia and the USA and arrives at similar findings to those 
discussed above. Rainwater and Smeeding conclude that social 
protection and the way household income is built up or “packaged” 
have far stronger effects on income poverty (and income inequality) 
than demographic factors such as age or household composition. 
Focusing on the Netherlands, they conclude that:  
It is the Dutch income package, not its demography, which produces low 
rates of poverty. 
Biewen and Jenkins (2002), using somewhat different methods 
also obtain similar findings: most of the poverty difference between 
the US and Britain, and between the US and Germany was 
accounted for by higher US risks of poverty for any given set of 
personal characteristics. This was partly offset by a more favourable 
distribution of household characteristics in the US, principally a 
higher employment rate. 
It is also worth noting the potential impact of another factor 
often mentioned as complicating cross-country comparisons of 
income poverty and income inequality, namely housing costs and 
home ownership. Measuring cash income does not take into 
account the fact that some households own their house and have 
paid off their mortgages, whereas others face high housing costs – 
so two households on the same income might have rather different 
spending power. While this complicates comparisons across 
households within countries, it also could affect comparisons across 
countries with very different rates of home ownership. Since Ireland 
has a very high rate of home ownership, this could be particularly 
important in assessing our comparative position. This has been 
investigated in two recent studies, one focusing on the analysis of 
poverty in Ireland (Fahey, Nolan and Maître 2004a) and the other 
on housing costs and income poverty across EU countries (Fahey, 
Nolan and Maître 2004b). These found that while the types of 
household found below relative income poverty lines might indeed 
be affected by using income after housing costs are subtracted, the 
impact on the overall scale of relative income poverty was modest.      
EARNINGS INEQUALITY 
Earnings constitute the predominant component of market income 
in most industrialised countries and have, in consequence, a major 
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influence on disposable income. We know that there is considerable 
diversity across countries in the dispersion of individual earnings 
(Atkinson et al., 1995) and that within countries earnings dispersion 
can change quite sharply over time. Earlier work (Nolan et al., 2000) 
on earnings inequality in Ireland has found that it was already quite 
high in 1987 relative to a range of countries, and rose sharply in 
subsequent years. This lends further weight to the notion that it may 
be useful to investigate the potential impact of earnings inequality 
on differences in relative income poverty between Ireland and other 
countries. 
Callan et al. (2004) investigate this issue again using a fairly 
straightforward technique. The question asked is what would 
happen in each country if earnings were distributed completely 
equally? i.e., if each wage earner received exactly the same total 
earnings – irrespective of occupation, qualifications, industry, sex, 
marital status or hours worked. This  would equalise wage earnings 
as between all those currently earning a wage – inequalities in 
income would still arise between persons who were employed, 
unemployed or out of the labour force. Equalisation of wages has 
downstream implications in terms of income tax liabilities and social 
welfare entitlements. For this reason, investigation of the impact of 
this hypothesis requires the use of a tax-benefit model. Callan et al. 
(2004) make use of the EUROMOD tax-benefit model to explore 
the impact of “wage equalisation” – or conversely, the inequality in 
wages – on measures of poverty in Denmark, Portugal, the UK and 
Ireland. As the head count is a poverty measure which can be 
particularly sensitive to small changes for individuals located in the 
neighbourhood of the income poverty line, two additional measures 
were also used: a “poverty gap” which takes into account how far 
individuals fall below the poverty line, and a “weighted poverty gap” 
which takes into account the distribution of such income shortfalls.  
For all three poverty measures, the results show that wage 
equalisation leads to substantial proportionate reductions in income 
poverty in Denmark, the UK and Portugal. Ireland is the exception 
– wage equalisation has a rather limited impact, no matter which 
measure of relative income poverty is used. As a result, it seems that 
differences in earnings inequality between Ireland and, say, 
Denmark are not likely to play a large role in explaining the 
difference in relative income poverty between the two countries. 
Even if Irish earnings inequality were to be eliminated completely it 
would have rather limited impact, while a lesser impact could be 
expected if the reduction in inequality was simply to the Danish 
level. 
WELFARE BENEFITS AND TAX  SYSTEMS 
To what extent can inter-country differences in relative income 
poverty rates be attributed to differences in tax/transfer systems? 
Aggregate measures indicate that social expenditure forms a low 
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proportion of national income in Ireland, much lower than in the 
EU countries with the lowest relative poverty rates.4 Aggregate level 
comparisons of “welfare effort” and relative income poverty rates 
suggest that there is a relationship. Data for 1999 suggest that an 
extra percentage point on social security as a proportion of GDP is 
associated, on average, with a reduction of 0.4 percentage points in 
the proportion of persons falling below 60 per cent of median 
income.  
There is, however, a more direct way to examine the possible 
impact of differences in tax and welfare structures on inter-country 
differences in relative income poverty. This involves using a tax-
benefit model which can examine the first-round impact of 
simulating a “foreign country” policy as well as its own domestic 
policies to arrive at a more precise estimate of how much policy 
differences contribute to the explanation of differences in poverty 
rates. Callan et al. (2004) use SWITCH, the ESRI tax benefit model, 
in conjunction with information on Danish policies generated in the 
construction of EUROMOD, a tax-benefit model for Europe, to 
undertake such an analysis. The year for which the comparison was 
undertaken was 1998. 
The impact of welfare benefits on relative income poverty 
depends crucially on how benefit payment rates relate to the poverty 
line, which is in turn related to average incomes. For this reason, we 
focus on benefit payment rates in Ireland and in Denmark in 
relation to national average earnings. When “importing” the Danish 
policy into the Irish setting, we ensure that the payment rate 
provides the same proportion of average earnings as in the original 
Danish setting. 
A further key difference is that a greater proportion of the 
Danish population is covered for key social insurance schemes than 
in Ireland. If eligibility depended on contributions then past 
employment history and contribution record would be critical. But 
for some of the biggest social insurance schemes in Denmark – 
including pensions – eligibility is linked to residence, so that how 
much is paid in pension depends on the length of stay in the 
country, not on former income or contribution record. In order to 
capture this difference, we simulate a “Danish-style” system in 
Ireland under which the payment rates for non-contributory and 
contributory Old Age Pensions are the same, and scaled to provide 
the same level of income in relation to average earnings as the 
Danish pension. 
As might be expected, there is a substantial cost associated with 
moving to Danish-style payment rates and coverage. The net cost 
(after tax revenue from increased payments) is of the order of 
€2,400 million per annum. To arrive at a consistent scenario for 
evaluation of the impact of such a policy, we examine a situation in 
 
4 The adjustments suggested by Lawlor and McCarthy (2003) would not alter this 
conclusion. 
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which the standard and top rates of income tax are raised by 11 
percentage points each (i.e., from 24 to 35 per cent, and from 46 to 
57 per cent). Clearly, such substantial changes in welfare payments 
and tax rates would have significant implications for labour market 
behaviour (see Callan et al. (2003) for estimates of likely behavioural 
responses to tax/transfer policy changes), and we return to this 
critical issue below. Nevertheless, it is of interest to explore the 
potential first-round impact of this change to tax and welfare 
policies on relative income poverty, before any consequent changes 
in behaviour. 
The simulation results show substantial falls in the Irish income 
poverty rate at 60 per cent of median income, the application of the 
Danish structure/support levels reducing the rate by 7 percentage 
points. There is little or no impact on poverty at the lower cut-offs. 
This means, loosely speaking, that differences in social protection 
could account for about two-thirds of the difference in actual 
relative poverty rates between the two countries with the 60 per 
cent threshold, which tends to be taken as the “headline” social 
inclusion indicator at EU level. This simulation takes into account 
the need to increase taxes, but does not take account of behavioural 
responses in the labour market. 
What are the broader lessons to be drawn from this analysis? 
Atkinson  has pointed out that:  
Social investment in improving labour market skills and employability, 
or an ‘active welfare state’, is an important part of anti-poverty policy, 
but is not a complete substitute for social spending (Atkinson, 2000). 
 
Thus, for anti-poverty policy to make progress requires enhanced 
education and employment opportunities and improved income 
supports. Both elements are necessary – neither is sufficient on its 
own to ensure success in combating relative income poverty. 
The success of countries such as Denmark and the Netherlands 
in keeping relative poverty at low levels over a sustained period 
depends crucially on both of these factors: a high employment rate 
and a comprehensive welfare system ensuring that those without 
income from employment have an adequate income. Each of these 
factors is necessary, but neither on its own can be regarded as 
sufficient to keep relative poverty at a low level. Since the mid- 
1980s Ireland has made the transition from a labour market with 
relatively low participation rates and high unemployment to one 
with high employment and low unemployment. This represents a 
major achievement, and one of the two key elements identified 
above as distinguishing countries with low relative poverty rates 
such as Denmark and the Netherlands from others. Over this 
period, however, relative income poverty in Ireland has remained 
higher than the EU average. Comparison with “best practice”, in 
the EU countries who do best on this indicator, suggests that 
achieving low rates of relative income poverty risk would require a 
more comprehensive safety net and higher rates of welfare payment. 
In considering this issue further it will be necessary to clarify how 
Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands have managed to 
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combine high replacement rates with high employment rates, and to 
be aware of current trends and issues in the management and 
development of these systems. 
 
 
4. 
Child Income 
Support Policy
EVOLUTION OVER TIME AND IN INTERNATIONAL 
CONTEXT 
We have seen that Ireland continues to have a high rate of relative 
income poverty risk for children, despite dramatic economic 
growth, and child income support policy has been high on the 
policy agenda here for a number of years, so it is worth focusing in 
on this topic here. Concern about child poverty and about work 
disincentives associated with income support for children – as well 
as about the costs of childcare – were among the factors behind a 
major shift in Irish child income support policy from the mid-
1990s. Table 4 sets out the evolution of payment rates for Child 
Benefit and for “child dependant additions” – that is extra payments 
for social welfare recipients with children, now termed “qualified 
child additions”. Much of the change occurred during the three 
years 1999 to 2002. Over this period, child benefit was almost 
trebled in nominal terms and more than doubled as a proportion of 
the average industrial wage. Over the full period, the total nominal 
expenditure on Child Benefit (CB), Child Dependant Additions 
(CDAs) and Family Income Supplement (FIS) more than trebled 
and the share of Child Benefit in the overall child income support 
package rose to about 80 per cent.  
Table 4: Rates of Payment for Child Benefit and Child Dependant Addition, 1997-2004 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
 € per week 
Child benefit (1st or 2nd child) 8.78 9.22 10.09 12.43 19.75 27.10 28.94 30.32 
Child benefit (3rd or higher 
order child) 11.41 12.29 13.46 16.38 25.16 33.94 36.24 38.09 
CDA for most schemes 16.76 16.76 16.76 16.76 16.76 16.80 16.80 16.80 
CDA for One-parent Family 
Payment 19.30 19.30 19.30 19.30 19.30 19.30 19.30 19.30 
CDA for Widow's Contributory 
Pension  21.59 21.59 21.59 21.59 21.59 21.60 21.60 21.60 
 
Table 5: Rates of Payment for Child Income Supports  as Percentage of Average Industrial 
Wage, 1997-2004 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
 Percentage of average industrial wage 
Child benefit (1st or 2nd child) 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.9 4.2 5.4 5.4 5.4 
Child benefit (3rd or higher 
order child) 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.8 5.3 6.8 6.7 6.8 
CDA for most schemes 4.5 4.3 4.1 3.8 3.6 3.3 3.1 3.0 
CDA for One-parent Family 
Payment 5.2 5.0 4.7 4.4 4.1 3.8 3.6 3.4 
CDA for Widow's Contributory 
Pension  5.8 5.6 5.3 4.9 4.6 4.3 4.0 3.8 
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How then does Irish child income support policy, after this 
major shift, compare with that of low-poverty countries such as 
Denmark? This needs to be investigated in depth but Table 6 below 
gives some interesting preliminary indications, looking at benefit 
payment rates as a proportion of the average industrial wage in 
Ireland and Denmark. It shows that in 1998 Irish child benefit rates 
were somewhat lower than the corresponding Danish rates – this 
was particularly for young children where the Danish rates were 
highest. Total child income support for those receiving child 
dependant additions varied across schemes both in Denmark and in 
Ireland. For those in receipt of the lowest child dependant addition 
the Irish rates were higher, but those on the highest payments did 
better in Denmark. Turning to Irish rates in 2004, we see that the 
substantial increase in Child Benefit has had a major impact, 
bringing our overall child income support above the levels paid in 
Denmark in 1998. Those receiving Child Benefit only, not CDAs, 
will have seen the most pronounced increase in support. However, 
over this particular period even those also on CDAs – which were 
frozen in nominal terms – saw their overall child income support 
package increase as a proportion of average industrial earnings.  
Table 6: Rates of Payment for Child Income Supports as 
Percentage of Average Industrial Wage, 1997-2004 
 
Ireland 
1998 
Denmark 
 1998 
Ireland 
2004 
Child benefit (1st or 2nd 
child) 2.4 2.9 - 4.1 5.4 
Child benefit + min CDA 6.7 4.6 - 5.8 8.4 
Child benefit + max CDA 8.0 7.9 - 9.1 9.2 
 
While more detailed comparisons are needed, results from a 22-
country study by Bradshaw and Finch (2002)5 confirm the 
impression that, at least in terms of cash benefits and taxes, the Irish 
system of child income support is now one of the more generous in 
relation to average wages. So the persistently high percentage of 
children – and of the population as a whole –  falling below relative 
income poverty thresholds in Ireland does not seem to be 
attributable to relatively low levels of child income support per se, 
certainly after recent increases. We look in more detail in the next 
section at the impact these increases may have had on the numbers 
– adults and children – falling below relative income thresholds. 
 
 
 
 
 
5 The USA, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Norway and Israel are 
included as well as the EU-15. 
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IMPACT OF RECENT RESTRUCTURING OF CHILD 
INCOME SUPPORT 
What was the impact of this expansion and refocusing of child 
income support on the overall extent of relative income poverty 
risk? In order to explore this question we focus in particular on the 
period between 1999 and 2002, which saw the biggest changes. 
Child Benefit was increased very significantly, CDA rates were 
frozen, and rates of Child Benefit exceeded the main CDA rates for 
the first time. 
A key issue in assessing the impact of these policy changes is 
establishing the appropriate counterfactual – what would have 
happened if these policy changes had not taken place? There is no 
single answer to this question, but we consider two counterfactuals: 
(a) Child benefit and CDAs could have been increased in line 
with average wages, with the money saved being spent in 
other ways outside the tax and benefit system e.g., 
infrastructure, retiring debt.  
(b) Child benefit and CDAs could have been increased in line 
with average wages, with the money saved instead being 
used for income tax reductions. (Our analyses for previous 
Budget Perspectives conferences of shifts in tax and 
welfare policy showed that resources over and above those 
needed for wage indexation of the tax and welfare systems 
tended to go to income tax reductions  before 1999.) 
Table 7: Relative Income Poverty: Impact of Increased Child Benefit 
Versus  "Indexed" Child Income Support Levels 1999-2002 
 
Child Benefit and CDAs indexed to 
wage growth since 1999 
Actual 2002 
policy 
Median income €301.53 €308.24 
Relative income cut-offs % of individuals below cut-off 
<   50 % of median 12.5 12.7 
<   60 % of median 22.0 20.9 
 
Table 7 shows that relative to indexing child income support 
rates to wage growth, the impact of the actual 2002 policy was to 
reduce relative income poverty at 60 per cent of median income by 
about 1 percentage point and have little impact at 50 per cent of the 
median.  
Table 8: Relative Income Poverty: Impact of Increased Child Benefit 
versus “Indexed” Child Income Support and Increased 
Personal Tax Credit 1999-2002 
 
Personal Tax Credit Increased, 
Child Benefit and CDAs indexed to 
wage growth  
Actual 2002 
policy 
Median income €307.47 €308.24 
Relative income cut-offs % of   individuals below cut-off 
<   50 % 13.5 12.7 
<   60 % 22.4 20.9 
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Table 8 shows that a somewhat stronger impact is found when 
comparing 2002 policy with an alternative involving additional tax 
cuts, with relative income poverty rates falling by about 1-1.5 
percentage points. 
In evaluating these effects, which may seem modest, it must be 
remembered that they refer to the overall number of below relative 
income thresholds, and that many of the households affected do not 
include children. It must be emphasised that the benchmark 
adopted has assumed Child Benefit would have been increased in 
line with wages anyway, so only the impact of the additional 
increases over and above that are being assessed. In fact, Child 
Benefit has in the past often been left unchanged in nominal terms 
for lengthy periods, and a comparison against such a benchmark 
would of course show larger effects.  
 
 While average income per head has risen dramatically in Ireland 
over the last decade, the numbers falling below relative income 
poverty thresholds (such as 50 per cent or 60 per cent of median 
income) remain well above the EU average. All those falling below 
such relative income thresholds are not poor: as the EU’s agreed 
Social Inclusion Indicators put it they are best seen as “at risk of 
poverty”. Consistent with the emphasis in the EU’s Social Inclusion 
Strategy on member states learning from one another, we have 
focused on what can be learned from a comparison of Ireland with 
EU countries which have sustained much lower percentages below 
such thresholds, notably The Netherlands and Denmark. 
5. 
Conclusions
Simulation approaches demonstrate that differences in the age 
profile (including the proportion of older people), the pattern of 
labour force participation (including unemployment), and 
household composition (including the frequency of lone 
parenthood) do not generally play the major role in the cross-
country variation in the percentage “at risk of poverty”. It also 
seems that differences in earnings inequality between Ireland and, 
say, Denmark do not play a large role in explaining the difference in 
relative income poverty between the two countries. Differences in 
tax and welfare rates and structures are more important: tax-benefit 
model simulations applying Danish welfare structures and support 
levels (relative to average income) to Ireland finds this substantially 
reduces income poverty risk. There is of course a substantial extra 
cost associated with Danish-style payment rates and coverage – if 
funded fully from income tax, the standard and top rates of income 
tax would each have to be raised by 11 percentage points, with 
major implications for incentives and behaviour.  
Child income support has been the focus of particular attention 
in Ireland, and the orientation of policy shifted dramatically towards 
universal rather than means-tested payment for a time. From 1999 
to 2002 Child Benefit more than doubled as a proportion of the 
average industrial wage, and the overall child income support 
package caught up on that payable in Denmark at the start of the 
period. Certainly by 2002 the high percentage falling below relative 
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income poverty thresholds does not seem to reflect low levels of 
child income support per se, but the overall support provided by 
social protection and the context in which it is provided.  
Successful anti-poverty policy requires both enhanced education 
and employment opportunities and improved income supports – 
neither is enough on its own. Countries such as Denmark and the 
Netherlands have sustained both high employment and a 
comprehensive welfare system ensuring that those without income 
from employment have an adequate income. Over the last decade 
Ireland has successfully made the transition to high employment 
and low unemployment rates. The experience of other EU countries 
suggests that achieving low rates of relative income poverty risk 
would in addition require a more comprehensive safety net and 
higher rates of welfare payment relative to average incomes. Such 
higher spending would of course have to be financed via higher 
taxation, and the implications for economic incentives, behaviour 
and growth are critically important to the strategic choices to be 
made. 
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IRELAND’S  HEALTH  
CARE SYSTEM: SOME 
ISSUES  AND 
CHALLENGES 
Anne Nolan and Brian Nolan1
 A variety of recent reports and strategy documents have highlighted 
the intimidating range of challenges facing Ireland’s health system as 
it seeks to improve its performance. In this short paper we cannot 
deal with these in any comprehensive fashion, but instead focus on 
three specific issues. First, we illustrate the value of trying to 
benchmark performance against other countries, as well as some of 
the difficulties that arise in such an exercise. Second, with primary 
care a central focus of official strategies we look at the use of general 
practitioner services by people at different income levels and in 
particular by those with and without entitlement to free GP care. 
Finally, we discuss the complex web of issues in relation to both 
equity and efficiency that arise from the unique role which private 
health insurance plays in the Irish healthcare system. 
1. 
Introduction
 
 How well is Ireland’s health care system functioning? Media 
attention tends to highlight waiting lists for acute hospital care and 
waiting times and conditions in A&E. These are real concerns, but the 
broader perspective gained by benchmarking performance against 
other countries can be particularly valuable, in this as in other areas. 
To provide this perspective we can draw on recent comparative 
compilations of data by the OECD and Eurostat and the 
methodology employed in a recent benchmarking exercise by the 
2. 
Benchmarking 
Ireland’s 
Performance
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1 We are grateful to ESRI colleagues and to Donal de Buitleir and Miriam Hederman-
O’Brien for comments on an earlier draft, and to the Health Research Board for 
funding the collaborative research programme on the Provision and Use of Health 
Services, Health Inequalities, and Health and Social Gain on which the paper draws. 
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Conference Board of Canada (see Conference Board of Canada, 
2004). 
The Conference Board adopts an interesting approach to 
benchmarking which distinguishes three dimensions: health status, 
non-medical factors and health outcomes. In each of these, the 
performance of OECD countries is assessed and each is awarded a 
gold, silver or bronze medal. “Gold medal” performance means the 
country is in the top one-third of the range on the indicator in 
question, “silver medal” performance means it is in the middle third 
and “bronze medal” means it is in the bottom one-third of the range. 
Note that this is not equivalent to being in the top one-third of 
countries on the indicator in question; indeed, if there was a big 
enough gap between the best and next-best performer, there might be 
only one country in the top one-third of the range of scores. That is 
precisely the appeal of this approach; it is based on how close to or 
far away from the best performers each country is, rather than simply 
on where they rank on each indicator. Based on their medal 
performance, countries are then ranked on each dimension and in 
aggregate across them, by assigning different values to gold, silver and 
bronze medal performance respectively.  
Unfortunately, the results presented by the Conference Board itself, 
although they do include Ireland, could be misleading because they 
fail to take into account that some of the indicators employed were 
missing for some countries. So here we apply their method, but re-
analyse the data taking this failing into account, i.e., instead of 
assigning a zero score to a country with missing information on an 
indicator, we exclude that indicator altogether from the analysis.2 In 
addition, the Conference Board analysis covers 24 OECD countries, 
including Mexico and South Korea. In certain instances, including 
Mexico and South Korea widens the range of values on the indicators 
and has a significant impact on the results. We prefer to confine 
attention to 22 OECD countries in Europe, North America, 
Australasia and Japan, using data from 2001.3
We look first at health status. Table 1 shows how the 22 OECD 
countries included in the analysis were ranked on the basis of four 
health status indicators: life expectancy for men and for women, 
infant mortality and low birth weight rates. We see that for these 
indicators Ireland has one gold medal and three bronze medals. 
Ireland performs poorly on life expectancy at birth for both men and 
 
2 Due to missing information for some countries, in the “health status” category we 
exclude disability-free life expectancy for men and women and self-reported health 
status while for the “non-medical factors” category, we exclude body weight and 
immunisation rates for influenza. 
3 We follow the Conference Board in not including five OECD countries (Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic and Turkey) for reasons to do with data 
availability and reliability, and Luxembourg on the basis of its size. In some instances, 
where data for 2001 are unavailable, data for earlier years are used instead. All data 
were obtained from the OECD Health Data for 2003.  
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women, which is in the bottom one-third of countries. Ireland also 
scores poorly on infant mortality, where again it is in the bottom one-
third of the range. In contrast, Ireland is among the best performers 
in terms of the proportion of babies born with low birth weight. 
A ranking of countries on this dimension can then be derived by 
aggregating across the indicators assigning a value of two for each 
gold medal, one for each silver medal and zero for each bronze 
medal. Ireland ranks joint 14th out of 22 countries on this basis. 
Health status indicators are of course affected by a wide range of 
factors other than health care, notably socio-economic and 
environmental conditions. None the less, the ultimate aim of health 
care is indeed to improve population health. 
Table 1: Comparative Performance of OECD Countries on Health 
Status Indicators 
Rank Country    Gold   Silver   Bronze Weighted 
Medal 
Count* 
1 Iceland 3 1  7 
1 Sweden 3 1  7 
3 Norway 2 2  6 
3 Japan 3  1 6 
5 Finland 2 1 1 5 
5 Canada 1 3  5 
5 Italy 1 3  5 
5 Switzerland 1 3  5 
5 Australia 1 3  5 
5 France 1 3  5 
5 Spain 1 3  5 
12 Netherlands 1 2 1 4 
12 Austria  4  4 
14 Ireland 1  3 2 
14 Belgium  2 2 2 
14 Denmark  2 2 2 
14 Germany  2 2 2 
14 New Zealand  2 2 2 
14 UK   2 2 2 
20 Portugal  1 3 1 
20 Greece  1 3 1 
22 US   4 0 
* Gold = 2; Silver = 1; Bronze = 0 
Source: OECD Health Data (2003), Conference Board of Canada (2004). 
 
In terms of the range of other factors influencing health status, the 
Conference Board also look at what they term “non-medical factors”, 
namely indicators relating to tobacco consumption, alcohol 
consumption, road traffic accidents, sulphur oxide emissions and 
immunisation rates. The results in Table 2 show that Ireland has one 
gold medal, two silver medals and two bronze medals on these 
indicators. Ireland does well on road traffic injuries, is in the middle 
range in terms of sulphur oxide emissions and the percentage of the 
adult population smoking daily but scores in the bottom range for 
alcohol consumption and childhood immunisations. Once again this 
leaves Ireland ranking low down, in joint last place with Japan. 
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Table 2: Comparative Performance of OECD Countries on Non-
Medical Factors  
Rank Country   Gold    Silver   Bronze Weighted 
Medal 
Count* 
1 Sweden 5   10 
2 Iceland 4 1  9 
3 Denmark 3 2  8 
3 Finland 3 2  8 
3 France 3 2  8 
3 Norway 4  1 8 
7 Belgium 2 3  7 
7 Germany 2 3  7 
7 Netherlands 3 1 1 7 
7 New Zealand 2 3  7 
7 Switzerland 3 1 1 7 
12 Australia 2 2 1 6 
12 Italy 1 4  6 
12 Portugal 2 2 1 6 
12 UK  1 4  6 
16 Austria 1 3 1 5 
16 Canada 2 1 2 5 
16 Greece 1 3 1 5 
16 Spain 2 1 2 5 
16 US 2 1 2 5 
21 Ireland 1 2 2 4 
21 Japan 2  3 4 
* Gold = 2; Silver = 1; Bronze = 0. 
Source: OECD Health Data (2003), Conference Board of Canada (2004). 
 
We focus next on key health outcomes, which one might expect to be 
affected by health care programmes and clinical interventions. The 
indicators employed relate to leading causes of mortality and 
premature mortality, namely cancer, heart attack, strokes and suicide. 
They measure mortality standardised for age for men and for women 
relating to lung cancer, heart attack and stroke, together with potential 
years of life lost through lung cancer for men and for women, female 
breast cancer and male suicide. Lower rates on these measures can be 
attributed both to lower incidence (which in turn relates inter alia to 
health-related behaviours) and to treatment. Once again, as Table 3 
shows, Ireland performs very poorly, ranking joint second last of the 
OECD countries included. While Ireland receives four gold medals 
(for male and female mortality rates from strokes and for male and 
female potential years of life lost due to lung cancer), Ireland scores 
particularly poorly on male and female mortality from heart attack 
(the highest rates in the OECD) and for potential years of life lost due 
to female breast cancer. 
One can then aggregate across the three dimensions and arrive at an 
overall score, simply by adding up the number of medals of each type 
and then deriving the weighted medal count. This should be seen as 
only an illustrative exercise, since it implicitly makes the strong 
assumption that we would want to treat each of the indicators in each 
of the dimensions as equally important, but may none the less be 
interesting. Table 4 shows that on this basis Ireland ranks second last 
of the 22 countries covered, ahead of only the USA. 
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Table 3: Comparative Performance of OECD Countries on Health 
Outcome Indicators  
Rank Country  Gold    Silver  Bronze Weighted 
Medal 
Count* 
1 Switzerland 9 1  19 
2 Italy 7 3  17 
2 Japan 8 1 1 17 
2 Spain 8 1 1 17 
5 Austria 6 4  16 
5 Sweden 6 4  16 
5 Australia 5 5  15 
5 France 6 3 1 15 
5 Norway 6 3 1 15 
10 Germany 4 6  14 
10 Portugal 6 2 2 14 
12 Finland 6 1 3 13 
12 Greece 5 3 2 13 
14 New Zealand 4 4 2 12 
14 UK  4 4 2 12 
16 Belgium 5 1 4 11 
16 Canada 2 7 1 11 
16 Ireland 4 3 3 11 
16 Netherlands 3 5 2 11 
16 US 2 7 1 11 
21 Denmark 3 4 3 10 
21 Iceland 3 4 3 10 
* Gold = 2; Silver = 1; Bronze = 0 
Source: OECD Health Data  (2003), Conference Board of Canada (2004). 
 
Table 4: Comparative Performance of OECD Countries on Health 
Status Indicators, Non-Medical Factors and Health Outcome 
Indicators  
Rank Country    Gold    Silver   Bronze Weighted 
Medal 
Count* 
 
1 Sweden 14 5 0 33 
2 Switzerland 13 5 1 31 
3 Norway 12 5 2 29 
4 France 10 8 1 28 
4 Italy 9 10 0 28 
6 Japan 13 1 5 27 
6 Spain 11 5 3 27 
8 Australia 8 10 1 26 
8 Finland 11 4 4 26 
8 Iceland 10 6 3 26 
11 Austria 7 11 1 25 
12 Germany 6 11 2 23 
13 Netherlands 7 8 4 22 
14 Canada 5 11 3 21 
14 New Zealand 6 9 4 21 
14 Portugal 8 5 6 21 
17 Belgium 7 6 6 20 
17 Denmark 6 8 5 20 
17 UK  5 10 4 20 
20 Greece 6 7 6 19 
21 Ireland 6 5 8 17 
22 US 4 8 7 16 
* Gold = 2; Silver = 1; Bronze = 0 
Source: OECD Health Data (2003), Conference Board of Canada (2004). 
 
So the performance of Ireland’s health-care system in comparative 
perspective is disappointing. What about the financial resources being 
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devoted to health care? Table 5 looks at overall health spending in 
2002 as a proportion of GDP, the conventional way of comparing 
expenditure across countries. In comparison with the 22 OECD 
countries we are including here, we see that Ireland is the lowest 
spender (jointly with Finland), with 7.3 per cent of GDP devoted to 
health care compared with an average of 9 per cent. However, as has 
been regularly pointed out, the use of GDP as the reference point 
may be misleading in the Irish case, since repatriation of profits 
abroad is both very high and variable from one year to the next. 
Expressing health expenditure as a proportion of GNP instead makes 
very little difference to any of the other countries covered but 
increases the Irish health spending share markedly, to 9 per cent – 
about the average. 
Table 5: Financial Resources Devoted to Health Care, OECD 
Countries, 2001 
Country Total Health 
Expenditure as a 
% of GDP 
Total Health 
Expenditure as 
a % of GNP 
Total Health 
Expenditure per 
Capita in $ PPP 
Australia 9.1 9.4 2,504 
Austria 7.7 7.8 2,220 
Belgium 9.1 8.9 2,515 
Canada 9.6 9.9 2,931 
Denmark 8.8 9.0 2,580 
Finland 7.3 7.3 1,943 
France 9.7 9.7 2,736 
Germany 10.9 10.9 2,817 
Greece 9.5 9.5 1,814 
Iceland 9.9 10.1 2,807 
Ireland 7.3 9.0 2,367 
Italy 8.5 8.5 2,166 
Japan 7.8 7.7 2,077 
Netherlands 9.1 9.3 2,643 
New Zealand 8.5 8.4 1,857 
Norway 8.7 8.6 3,083 
Portugal 9.3 9.5 1,702 
Spain 7.6 7.7 1,646 
Sweden 9.2 9.3 2,517 
Switzerland 11.2 10.4 3,445 
UK 7.7 7.6 2,160 
US 14.6 14.5 5,267 
    
OECD 22 Average 9.1 9.2 2,536 
Source: OECD Health Data (2004) (for total health expenditure and GDP) and 
European Commission, AMECO Macro-Economic Database 2004 (for 
GNP).  
 
However, the most striking feature of Ireland’s health spending is 
how rapidly it has been increasing in absolute terms in recent years. 
Whatever about relative to rapidly increasing GNP, health spending 
has risen very rapidly indeed in nominal terms – from €2.2 billion to 
€9.4 billion between 1990 and 2002. Even when adjusted for the 
increases in relevant prices, health spending has risen markedly in 
purchasing power terms. Figure 1 charts Irish total health expenditure 
per capita in purchasing power terms from 1990 to 2002, as calculated 
by the OECD, and by the end of the period the level of spending was 
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3 times higher than in 1990. This depends of course on the reliability 
of the adjustment made for the change in prices of the goods and 
services involved (holding “quality” constant), which is notoriously 
difficult to capture in the health care area. It is also worth noting that 
despite its rapid rate of increase, the level of spending per capita in 
purchasing power terms in Ireland had still not reached the average 
for these 22 OECD countries by 2002. 
 
Figure 1: Ireland’s Total Health Expenditure Per Capita Expressed in $ 
PPP, 1990-2002 
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Source: OECD Health Data (2004). 
 
It is also worth entering an important caveat in relation to the 
comparative perspective on Ireland’s health spending. This is 
illustrated by the comparison of the trend in health spending shown 
in Figure 2 labelled “2003 OECD data” with the line labelled “2002 
OECD data”. The latter shows the figures published in 2002 by the 
OECD in their databank and in “Health At a Glance”, the source on 
which comparisons of this sort for OECD countries now rely. We 
can see that this shows substantially higher levels of health spending 
for Ireland than the set produced in 2003. This is because, in 
compiling their 2003 set of data, the OECD with the help of the 
Department of Health and Children re-examined the nature of the 
spending involved, and decided to exclude certain sub-heads of Irish 
public health spending which relate to what would in other countries 
probably be counted as social services or social transfers. 
Consequently, the percentage of GNP accounted for by health 
spending in Ireland for 2000 fell from 7.8 per cent using the 2002 data 
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to 7.4 per cent using the 2003 data. (The most recent OECD figures, 
published in mid-2004, are on the same basis as the 2003 figures – see 
also the discussion in Wren (2004)).  
The point is not that this reclassification was inappropriate, but rather 
that there is no guarantee that spending in other countries is delimited 
in exactly the same way. What is being counted as health spending 
may not be harmonised across countries to the extent one would 
want, despite the best efforts of the OECD. In relation to the hazards 
of comparative analysis it is also worth noting that the recently-
produced OECD figures only carry this re-categorisation of health 
spending in the Irish case back to 1990, so the unsuspecting user of 
their data will get a misleading picture of the increase in health 
spending over time if the base year used is earlier than that.   
 
Figure 2: Total Health Expenditure in Ireland, 1990-2001, in OECD 
Database 2002 Versus 2003  
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 As we noted in the introduction to this paper, primary care has 
become a central focus of official health strategy as Ireland, like many 
other countries, seeks to shift the emphasis from expensive hospital-
based health care to primary curative and preventative interventions. 
General practitioners play the central role in primary care, and one of 
the most distinctive features of the Irish health care system is the 
pricing of GP services. For those who have medical card cover – 
generally because they fall below the specified income threshold – GP 
visits are free. For the rest of the population, GP visits must be paid 
for out of pocket on a fee per service basis; usually the patient has to 
bear that full cost (i.e., it is not reimbursed even where they have 
health insurance). GPs are free to set the charge to meet their full 
costs and provide them with an income and the majority of GPs 
provide services to both sets of patients – medical cardholders and 
non-medical cardholders. In many other OECD countries, by 
contrast, primary care is either free or heavily subsidised, by one 
means or another, for most or all of the population. 
3. 
Use of  GP 
Services by 
Income Level 
and Medical 
Card Status
This pricing structure in the Irish context gives rise to a number of 
concerns, so it is useful to look at the empirical evidence about the 
use of general practitioner services by people at different income 
levels, and in particular by those with and without entitlement to free 
GP care due to the medical card system. Once again it is helpful to 
start with a comparative perspective. Using data from the European 
Community Household Panel Survey for representative samples of 
the populations of most of the “old” EU 15 countries, we can derive 
GP visiting rates for adults by position in the income distribution.4 
Table 6 shows for 2001 the average number of GP visits in the 
previous year for adults (aged 16+) in the bottom one-tenth (decile) 
of the income distribution in their country, the next one-tenth and so 
on up to the top one-tenth, as well as the overall average. (This 
ranking is on the basis of household income adjusted for the size and 
composition of the household using what are termed “equivalence 
scales”.)  
We see first that the overall average visiting rate in Ireland, of 3.6 
visits per person per year, is about the middle of the range across 
these countries. That range is in fact rather wide, running from almost 
5 in Austria, Belgium and Italy down to less than 2 in Greece, 
reflecting inter alia the different roles played by general practitioners in 
different healthcare systems. The Irish average is slightly higher than 
the UK, where the GP role is similar. 
Looking now at the way the frequency of GP visiting varies across the 
income distribution, we see that in almost all countries visiting rates 
are higher towards the bottom of the distribution and lower towards 
 
4 Sweden did not participate in the survey, and some other countries (Germany, 
France) participated but did not have exactly the data we are focusing on here for 
2001.   
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the top (Finland being the exception with a very flat pattern across 
the deciles). However, the gap between top and bottom varies a good 
deal. In Ireland, visiting rates are about twice as high towards the 
bottom compared with the top, whereas in most of the other 
countries that ratio is rather lower, at approximately 1.5. Where 
Ireland also stands out, none the less, is in the very sharp fall in the 
visiting rate as one goes from the second to the third decile – when 
the average number of visits drops from 6.6 to 3.6. No other country 
sees such a sharp decline; the obvious question to ask is whether this 
could reflect the impact of medical card entitlement on the cost of a 
GP visit to patients. (The visiting rate in the Irish case also jumps up 
again in the sixth decile and then down in the eight, but the gap 
between the second and third decile is considerably wider.) 
Table 6: GP Visiting Rates for Adults 16+ by Income Decile, EU Countries, 2001 
Country Bottom 
10% 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Top 
10% 
All 
Austria 5.8 6.4 5.1 4.8 5.0 4.7 3.7 4.1 4.3 3.8 4.7 
Belgium 7.6 6.9 6.2 4.8 5.0 4.7 3.8 3.5 3.5 3.6 4.9 
Denmark 3.4 3.6 3.6 4.1 2.8 2.7 2.1 2.0 2.3 2.0 2.9 
Finland 1.8 2.6 2.4 2.4 2.0 1.9 2.0 1.9 2.3 1.8 2.1 
Greece 2.5 2.4 2.1 1.9 2.1 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.6 1.2 1.9 
Ireland 4.8 6.6 3.6 3.0 3.1 4.1 3.7 2.3 2.6 2.4 3.6 
Italy 5.0 5.7 5.0 5.6 5.8 4.9 4.3 4.3 4.3 3.9 4.9 
Netherlands 3.4 3.2 3.2 3.1 2.8 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.8 
Portugal 3.8 3.6 4.1 2.8 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.6 2.5 2.6 3.1 
Spain 4.5 5.6 4.2 4.4 4.3 3.6 4.0 3.5 3.0 1.9 3.9 
UK 3.8 4.4 3.7 3.4 3.3 3.2 2.9 2.7 2.8 2.5 3.2 
Source: European Community Household Panel Survey ( 2001). 
Note: Data are unavailable for France, Germany and Sweden. 
 
The first point to note is that people in the various deciles differ not 
only in terms of income but also in terms of other characteristics that 
may well influence their use of health services, most obviously their 
age. The incomes of older people are particularly concentrated in 
Ireland, with a high proportion on low (but not the lowest) incomes. 
Therefore, the difference in visiting rates between the second and 
third deciles could partly reflect the fact that far more people in the 
second decile are older. In addition the Irish situation in 2001, the 
year to which these figures relate, is complicated by the fact that 
medical card entitlement was extended to all those aged 70 years or 
over in the latter part of the year. It is therefore useful to look in 
Table 7 at visiting rates across the various countries for those aged 
between 16 and 69  years only. 
This shows that the overall average visiting rate for Ireland is once 
again in the middle of the range across these countries and slightly 
above that in the UK. The differential between the top and bottom of 
the income distribution is narrower than when the elderly were 
included, but is still substantial and particularly marked in the Irish 
case. Furthermore, although the drop in visiting rate comparing the 
second and the third deciles is now smaller, from 5.5 to 3.1, it is still 
very large and unusual both in a comparative context and in terms of 
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the pattern across other deciles in Ireland. So these figures certainly 
suggest that it is worth investigating in some depth whether the 
distinctive features of the “pricing system” for GP visits in Ireland 
has implications for use of the services.  
Table 7: GP Visiting Rates for Adults Aged 16-69 Years by Income Decile, EU Countries, 2001 
Country Bottom 10 
per cent  
Country 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Top 10 
per cent 
All 
Austria 4.3 5.1 4.2 4.5 4.1 3.9 3.2 3.8 3.6 3.3 3.9 
Belgium 6.0 5.2 5.0 4.2 4.2 4.2 3.2 3.3 3.3 3.2 4.1 
Denmark 2.6 2.2 3.6 4.2 2.6 2.7 2.1 1.8 2.3 1.9 2.6 
Finland 1.8 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.0 1.9 2.0 1.9 2.3 1.9 2.1 
Greece 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.6 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.4 
Ireland 4.2 5.5 3.1 2.9 2.7 4.0 3.6 2.3 2.4 2.3 3.2 
Italy 4.3 4.4 3.7 4.2 4.5 4.2 3.5 3.9 3.7 3.6 4.0 
Netherlands 3.4 3.0 2.8 2.8 2.4 2.8 2.4 2.1 2.3 2.2 2.6 
Portugal 3.2 3.1 3.4 2.5 2.8 2.6 2.7 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.7 
Spain 4.0 4.3 3.5 3.6 3.7 2.9 3.6 3.2 2.8 1.7 3.3 
UK 3.7 4.2 3.6 3.2 3.1 3.0 2.8 2.6 2.7 2.4 3.0 
Source: European Community Household Panel (2001). 
Notes: Data are unavailable for France, Germany and Sweden. 
 
We have pursued this using micro-data from the Living in Ireland 
Survey, the Irish element of the European Community Household 
Panel. Estimation of an econometric model of GP visiting behaviour 
using Irish data for 2001 allows us to relate the reported number of 
visits by each adult to a range of characteristics including their age, 
gender, education, household income and medical card status. 
Valuably, we were also able to control to some extent for differences 
in health status, which is particularly important since those on low 
incomes are distinctive not just in having medical card cover, but are 
also likely to have poorer health and a greater need for health care 
than the rest of the population. While the measures of health status 
available to us in the survey are crude, they do allow us to go some 
way towards taking such differences in needs into account.  
Cross-sectional analysis described in detail in Nolan and Nolan (2003) 
and Madden, Nolan and Nolan (2004) find that medical card 
entitlement has a highly statistically significant and substantial 
influence on the number of GP visits an individual reports. Having 
controlled for all the other characteristics mentioned, including health 
status, those with medical card cover have on average about 1.6 more 
visits each year than those with similar characteristics but without a 
medical card. Even if the health status indicators available to us 
understate the difference in needs between those with and without 
medical cards, it seems likely that the different financial incentives 
they face also play a role in producing this very substantial gap.  
It is also important to investigate whether this effect is more 
pronounced in the income ranges above but still quite close to the 
medical card threshold. There has been a great deal of concern 
expressed about the position of families just above the threshold, who 
would be brought within medical card entitlement by raising the 
threshold as the government are committed to doing at some point. 
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For this paper we tested whether proximity to the threshold makes a 
marked difference to visiting rates by introducing a set of interaction 
terms between income decile and the variable in our model capturing 
medical card status. These interaction terms do not turn out to be 
statistically significant. These results suggest, on the face of it, that the 
key difference in terms of GP visiting rates in Ireland is simply 
between those with and without medical cards.  
While the analysis to date has been cross-sectional, we have also 
begun to exploit in this context the longitudinal nature of the Living 
in Ireland Survey data, i.e., the fact that it sought to interview the 
same individuals from one year to the next. This means we can follow 
people from 1995 up to 2001 and identify those who moved from 
having medical card cover to not having cover and vice versa, and 
investigate whether their GP visiting rates changed. Visiting rates do 
fall on average when medical card cover is lost and rise when medical 
card cover is “gained”, but this could be for a variety of reasons 
including changes in health and thus the need for care.5 The next 
stage in the analysis is to estimate econometric models controlling for, 
among other things, changes in reported health status and see the 
extent to which changes in visiting rates not associated with such 
variation in need are identified.  
How should one react to the fact that medical card holders visit the 
GP more often than those without cover, even when we control for 
measured differences in health status? Does this mean that medical 
cardholders “overconsume” or non-medical cardholders 
“underconsume” GP services, or indeed both? Deciding on an 
appropriate benchmark against which to make such a judgement is 
difficult, since we do not know the “right” level of visiting from a 
medical, much less a cost-effectiveness point of view. International 
comparisons reveal countries with higher average levels of visiting 
towards the bottom of the income distribution than Ireland, and ones 
with similar (though not lower) rates towards the top. What we can 
say is that, given the gap between those with and without medical 
cards, it is unlikely that both are optimal – again, from a medical or 
cost-effectiveness point of view.  
If we regard the present situation as distorted, then, the next issue is 
best how to address that distortion. From an incentives perspective, 
one can look at both supply and demand sides, providers and 
patients. Focusing on providers, it seems plausible that providers paid 
on a fee-for-service basis to treat patients facing zero price would be 
particularly likely to induce demand; this was indeed a key rationale 
behind the change in the reimbursement system for GMS GPs in the 
late 1980s, following on the research by Tussing (1985). However, 
when we estimated the cross-sectional models mentioned earlier for 
 
5 It would hardly be surprising if visiting fell when someone moved from being out 
of work due to illness or disability into work, or rose when the opposite occurred, but 
the pattern described remains when we exclude such cases. 
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1987, 1995 and 2000, this did not reveal any narrowing of the gap 
between medical card holders and others after the change to a 
capitation reimbursement system (see Madden, Nolan and Nolan, 
2004).  
Turning to the patient side of the equation, the issue of charging for 
health care and its impact on utilisation and efficiency is a perennial 
and much-debated one in the health economics literature (see Nolan 
(1993) for a discussion). The key question is not now whether charges 
affect utilisation – the accumulating evidence is that they do, and our 
findings to date are consistent with that pattern. Rather, the critical 
question is whether charges reduce “necessary” as well as 
“unnecessary” visits, and by its nature that is very difficult to assess. 
Perhaps the most important point to stress in this context is the 
uncertainty inherent in making that distinction for the patient ex post. 
It is difficult for experts to make an assessment of the value of a 
specific visit after the event; it is even more difficult for a “layman” to 
do so when deciding whether to visit, since the motive for visiting a 
doctor is often to see if medical intervention is needed because the 
individual simply does not have the knowledge to make that 
judgement. This uncertainty, identified as critically important to the 
economics of health care as long ago as Arrow (1963), means that 
charges inevitably discourage “necessary” as well as “unnecessary” 
visits. This of course applies to the current substantial charges facing 
Irish patients without medical cards, as well as to any charges that 
might be levied on medical card patients. 
 
 Over the past decade or so the context in which Ireland’s complex 
mix of public and private health care operates has changed radically, 
as the numbers purchasing health insurance soared and the nature of 
the insurance market has changed in response to EU regulations. This 
has widened the divide between those with and without health 
insurance, and called into question the public-private structure on 
which Ireland has relied for many years. Almost half the Irish 
population now pay for private health insurance, one of the highest 
levels of coverage in the OECD. This is despite the fact that hospital 
care is covered by private health insurance and everyone has 
entitlement to public hospital care from the state. The insured can 
avail of “private” health care, but much of this private care is actually 
delivered in public hospitals. The resulting two-tier system is now 
widely regarded as problematic from an equity perspective, but there 
are also serious efficiency issues arising from the incentive structures 
embedded in this particularly close intertwining of public and private.  
4. 
Health 
Insurance
It is worth dwelling briefly on how this situation has come about. For 
many years those towards the top of the income distribution in 
Ireland have been encouraged to take out “private” health insurance. 
In the late 1950s the Voluntary Health Insurance Board (VHI) was 
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established as a monopoly state-backed not-for-profit health insurer 
to cater for the top 15 per cent or so of the income distribution, who 
did not (then) have entitlement to public hospital care from the state. 
This state-backed insurer operated community rating and income tax 
relief was available on premia paid. This structure was designed, inter 
alia, to ensure that the entire population had access to hospital care 
while satisfying the demands of medical consultants that their private 
practice not be undermined. Those towards the top of the 
distribution were in effect encouraged to take out “private” insurance, 
while the cost of in-patient care for the rest of the population was 
fully covered by the state. 
To complicate the picture – and it is a crucial difference between 
Ireland and many other countries – not only was “private” insurance 
provided for many years by what was to all intents and purposes an 
arm of the State, much of the “private” care it covers was and is 
delivered in public hospitals. Medical consultants retained the right to 
treat their private patients in public hospitals, and about half of all 
private hospital care is in fact delivered in those hospitals. Most 
patients receiving private care – in a public or private hospital – have 
insurance, and the insurer reimburses both medical consultant and 
hospital. However, for many years public hospitals only charged for 
the “hotel” facilities associated with being in a private room. In 
addition, most medical consultants are contracted to care for public 
patients in public hospitals on a salaried basis, while maintaining the 
scope to treat private patients on a fee-for-service basis. The public 
and private systems in Ireland, rather than being distinct, have had 
what has accurately been described as a symbiotic relationship 
(Barrington, 1987; see also Wren, 2003).    
From the 1950s to the late 1970s or early 1980s, this public-private 
mix supported by “private” health insurance functioned in roughly 
the way it was designed to do, with a monopoly insurer covering 
private care for the well-off and in effect “topping up” the public 
system. There have been fundamental changes in the health insurance 
landscape since then. The first is the dramatic rise in the percentage of 
the population buying health insurance. This jumped up from about 
20 per cent to 30 per cent in the late 1970s, jumped once again in 
1987 to 35 per cent, rose steadily through the 1990s and by now is 
very close to half the population. This occurred despite the fact that 
full entitlement to public hospital care (subject to some charges levied 
on all those without medical card cover) was extended to the top part 
of the income distribution in the early 1990s.  
So health insurance in Ireland, having been the preserve of the better-
off for many years, now covers half the population. Quite why this 
increase in the numbers buying health insurance has occurred is not 
well understood. The scale of economic growth and increasing real 
household incomes in Ireland during the 1990s – the “Celtic Tiger” – 
has clearly made it possible for more people, but this does not explain 
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why they want or feel the need to have health insurance cover. The 
upward trend in numbers insured has also proved remarkably resilient 
in the face of significant annual premium increases and a diminution 
in income tax relief as tax rates fell and relief was scaled back to the 
standard rather than the purchaser’s marginal tax rate. Econometric 
time-series analysis also suggests that the evolution of income and 
price still leave much of the increase in demand to be explained 
(Harmon and Nolan, 2001), so it is also important to explore what 
people think they are buying when they buy insurance, and the 
alternative they face or believe they face without it.  
Attitudinal surveys (see for example, Watson and Williams (2001), 
Health Insurance Authority (2003)) suggest that concern about 
waiting times for public hospital care is uppermost in people’s minds, 
that quality of care has also come to be seen as a significant issue, and 
that having a private room or other “hotel” aspects are not seen as an 
important reason for buying private insurance. Waiting times for 
public hospitals are widely perceived to be long, both by those with 
and without insurance. So what people essentially believe they are 
buying is the assurance that they can access hospital care when they 
need it, without undue waiting and with care from a medical 
consultant of their choice. 
It seems plausible then that perceptions of access to public hospitals 
combined with perceptions of the quality of public versus private care 
are key drivers underpinning demand for health insurance. The role of 
media coverage in influencing such perceptions merits examination, 
but there are indeed long waits for certain types of public hospital 
treatment that are by-passed by those with insurance. In one of the 
attitudinal surveys, for example, almost half the respondents said they 
personally knew someone who recently had a lengthy wait for public 
hospital treatment – so they were not simply reacting to media 
reports. 
This two-tier hospital system is now widely regarded as problematic 
from an equity perspective. Indeed, the issue of equity of access to 
hospital care for public versus private patients has become a very high 
profile one politically and equity as a goal has been highlighted in the 
official Health Strategy produced after lengthy consultation in 2001. 
The focus of policy has been on regulating access to public hospitals, 
on the proportion of private versus public beds in them, on the 
charges for private care in public hospitals and on reducing waiting 
times for public patients. However, in our view this focus misses 
some deep-seated structural problems, in respect to both equity and 
efficiency, which the recent upsurge in numbers insured has not 
created but has certainly exacerbated.    
Dealing first with equity, a number of different layers to the argument 
may be usefully distinguished in assessing the fairness of the current 
system. Where separate and distinct public and private healthcare 
systems operate side-by-side and private health insurance provides 
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cover for the latter, then a likely outcome is that those with insurance 
– who are most often on higher incomes – will have more rapid 
access to health care. Views may, and do, differ about whether this is 
equitable, both within and across societies. However, the role of the 
state in subsidising health insurance or private health care, directly or 
indirectly, adds a further dimension: some who see differential access 
as fair if the full cost is being paid by those “going privately” might 
question its fairness if the taxpayer is in effect covering part of the 
cost. A further, and even more complex, dimension arises when – as 
in the Irish case – much of the private care to which those with 
insurance gain access is actually being delivered in public hospitals. In 
that situation, the financial flows underpinning the system are more 
difficult to disentangle but the two-tier nature of access by those with 
versus without insurance is more striking.    
So what is distinctive about the Irish case is that the public hospital 
system has come to be seen very widely as a two-tier one, offering the 
better-off more rapid access; the fact that they are in effect subsidised 
by the taxpayer in doing so is less widely debated but well understood 
by analysts. Subsidisation comes through tax breaks on insurance 
premia and below-cost charges for private care in public hospitals; 
recently this charge has been raised significantly but still represents an 
implicit subsidy to private care in public hospitals (Nolan and Wiley, 
2001). The clarity of the distinction between private versus public 
beds in those hospitals and how to ensure that private patients do not 
obtain preferential access through public beds have also been the 
focus of particular attention from policy makers.  
Even if private care in public hospitals covered its full cost or even 
generated a surplus to cross-subsidise care of public patients, an 
equity concern would arise about two-speed access to those hospitals. 
The main argument advanced for retention of private care in public 
hospitals is that this allows the most able medical specialists to be 
available to care for public patients. There has been no attempt to 
assess the scale of the purported benefits to the public system, nor 
whether the benefits of close interaction with private care are 
outweighed by the costs. 
These costs include not only the direct and indirect subsidisation 
already mentioned, but also the distortionary impact of the incentives 
for medical consultants and hospital managers associated with the 
inter-mingling of public and private care. Most medical consultants 
employed to treat public patients, and paid a salary for doing so, also 
have private patients for whom they are paid on a fee-per-service 
basis. While consultants are committed to a specified number of 
hours per week caring for public patients there is no effective 
monitoring and the incentive they face to concentrate more of their 
attention on private patients – even if it is by working very long hours 
over and above their public commitment – may clearly be to the 
detriment of public patients. (Unlike private patients, many public 
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patients will be treated by more junior doctors.) Public hospital 
managers also face an incentive to maximise revenue from private 
patients in any given year, since this is one of the few sources of 
additional revenue available to them.  
Some of these incentive issues might still feature, though they would 
probably be less pronounced, if private care was delivered only in 
private hospitals – if for example consultants still had a mix of private 
and public patients and were in effect incentivised to prioritise the 
former. Equity concerns could still be raised about faster access to 
such private hospitals, especially if the state subsidises them not only 
indirectly by favourable tax treatment of insurance premia and via 
training of staff in the public system, but also by direct tax breaks to 
encourage building private facilities as have recently been introduced 
by the Irish government. However, both efficiency and equity 
concerns are undoubtedly heightened by Ireland’s peculiarly intimate 
public-private mix.  
Health insurance underpins Ireland’s public/private mix. The major 
change in the landscape in that respect came in response to the EU’s 
1992 Third Non-Life Insurance Directive, designed to stimulate 
competition in insurance. The Irish government enacted legislation 
opening up the health insurance market, and BUPA Ireland 
commenced operation in 1997. The way that market operates is 
tightly regulated: Ireland obtained approval from the EU to continue 
to require all insurers to apply open enrolment, community rating and 
lifetime cover, as enshrined in the 1994 Health Insurance Act and the 
1996 Health Insurance Regulations. In 2001 the Health Insurance 
Authority was set up to oversee and regulate the market. Among its 
responsibilities is the implementation of a risk equalisation scheme in 
order to support community rating. This has proved particularly 
controversial and no transfer of funds across insurers has yet taken 
place. The VHI continues to dominate the market, with about 95 per 
cent of subscribers and although its status has been debated it remains 
a not-for-profit body whose board is appointed by the Minister for 
Health, requiring official approval for changes in premium levels.  
The highly regulated nature of the private health insurance market in 
Ireland is distinctive. Open enrolment, community rating and lifetime 
cover are enshrined as core principles, reflecting the role which public 
policy has traditionally assigned to insurance in the health care system. 
These restrictions have not been much debated and appear widely 
supported, but their rationale is in fact open to question. The logic 
that applied when public policy saw insurance financing hospital care 
for the well-off cannot simply carry over to what is now a very 
different situation. Indeed, it is far from clear where policy now sees 
insurance fitting in and going, in a situation where everyone is entitled 
to avail of public care on the same basis but half choose to buy 
insurance.   
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Implementation of the risk equalisation scheme in order to support 
community rating, on the other hand, has proved controversial – at 
least between the two insurers who would be affected. A vigorous 
debate between them has continued as to the justification for such a 
scheme and the need for a transfer and no transfer of funds across 
insurers has yet taken place. This uncertainty may be acting as a 
deterrent to the entry of further insurers to compete in the Irish 
market. 
None the less, the entry of BUPA and potential entry of further 
insurers is a fundamental change in the health insurance market. The 
fact that the VHI, though still dominating the market, faces real 
competition from BUPA and the potential for entry by more 
competitors has clearly affected behaviour in the market. This is most 
obvious in the range of new insurance products which continue to 
appear and the efforts to market them. Despite competition, however, 
the cost of insurance has continued to rise.  
As well as the supply side, the prospects for the demand for health 
insurance are also uncertain. Even if it were to plateau at about the 
current level, the dynamic effects of recent growth in the numbers 
purchasing health insurance still have to work their way through. It is 
not clear, from a financial or broader public policy perspective, 
whether a 50/50 split between those with and without insurance, is 
inherently unstable. From a public policy perspective, it is hard to see 
why the number taking out private insurance should in itself be a 
target variable. If, however, public policy gave priority to effectively 
improving access to, and quality of, care for public patients in public 
hospitals this might have a significant impact on demand for private 
insurance, given the apparent importance of perceptions of the public 
system in promoting that demand. 
While health has of course become an extremely high-profile and 
politically sensitive topic, health insurance itself has not come centre-
stage in the public debate – which has focused on waiting times for 
public hospital care and the location of those hospitals. Some 
alternative structures involving “insurance for all”, either via social 
insurance or subsidised private insurance, have been put forward but 
this discussion has not as yet progressed very far. The slogan that 
“everyone should be a private patient” amply illustrates that having 50 
per cent of the population with insurance alters the context for such a 
debate. However, it will clearly be difficult to move forward when 
“insurance for all” means very different things to different groups 
advocating it – and clarity about who would gain and lose is notably 
lacking. In sum, recent Irish experience shows that a structure 
designed to take advantage of possible benefits for the public system 
of close interaction with private care can create perverse incentives 
and potentially undermine that public system. The numbers currently 
with health insurance can also be expected to fundamentally influence 
the political economy of structural reform. 
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 This paper began by illustrating the value of benchmarking the 
performance of Ireland’s health-care system against other countries. 
This showed that performance, as reflected in a variety of indicators, 
to be disappointing. Some of the difficulties in such a benchmarking 
exercise were seen when we looking at a key indicator, namely the 
level of health spending. This has risen very rapidly indeed in nominal 
terms in recent years, outpacing even the exceptional scale of 
economic growth. However, in purchasing power terms and as a 
percentage of GNP it was only at the UK level – which the British 
government considers too low compared with other EU countries – 
by 2002. Re-classification of some spending by the Department of 
Health by the OECD in 2003 also significantly reduced their estimate 
of Ireland’s health spending, a process which may not be applied 
uniformly across countries. 
5. 
Summary and 
Conclusions
With primary care a central focus of official strategies we then 
investigated the use of general practitioner services by people at 
different income levels, in particular those with and without 
entitlement to free GP care. Having controlled for other 
characteristics, including health status, those with medical card cover 
were found to have on average about 1.6 more visits each year than 
those with similar characteristics but without a medical card. Even if 
the health status indicators available to us understate the difference in 
needs between those with and without medical cards, it seems likely 
that the different financial incentives they face also play a role in 
producing this very substantial gap. The current substantial charges 
facing Irish patients without medical cards in all probability 
discourage some “necessary” as well as “unnecessary” GP visits, and 
this would also apply to introducing charges for medical card patients, 
essentially because of the uncertainty about drawing this distinction – 
particularly for the layman in deciding whether to visit. 
Finally, we identified some key issues in relation to both equity and 
efficiency arising from the unique role which private health care and 
health insurance plays in the Irish health care system. The public 
hospital system facilitates the better-off in obtaining more rapid 
access to care, and incentives for medical consultants and hospital 
managers are distorted by the inter-mingling of public and private 
care. Health insurance underpins this public/private mix in a highly 
regulated market. Open enrolment, community rating and lifetime 
cover reflects the role which public policy has traditionally assigned to 
insurance, but the logic that applied when insurance financed hospital 
care for the top 15 per cent now needs to be re-examined. A structure 
designed to take advantage of possible benefits for the public system 
of close interaction with private care has created perverse incentives 
and come to be seen as inequitable in terms of access and utilisation, 
and could potentially undermine that public system. However, the 
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numbers now having health insurance also fundamentally influence 
the political economy of structural reform. 
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